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Abstract
We study the design of differentially private algorithms for adaptive analysis of dynamically growing
databases, where a database accumulates new data entries while the analysis is ongoing. We provide a
collection of tools for machine learning and other types of data analysis that guarantee differential privacy
and accuracy as the underlying databases grow arbitrarily large. We give both a general technique and
a specific algorithm for adaptive analysis of dynamically growing databases. Our general technique is
illustrated by two algorithms that schedule black box access to some algorithm that operates on a fixed
database to generically transform private and accurate algorithms for static databases into private and
accurate algorithms for dynamically growing databases. These results show that almost any private and
accurate algorithm can be rerun at appropriate points of data growth with minimal loss of accuracy, even
when data growth is unbounded. Our specific algorithm directly adapts the private multiplicative weights
algorithm of [HR10] to the dynamic setting, maintaining the accuracy guarantee of the static setting
through unbounded data growth. Along the way, we develop extensions of several other differentially
private algorithms to the dynamic setting, which may be of independent interest for future work on the
design of differentially private algorithms for growing databases.
1 Introduction
Technological advances are continuously driving down the cost of data collection and storage. Data collection
devices such as smartphones and wearable health monitors have become ubiquitous, resulting in continuous
accumulation of new data. This means that the statistical properties of a database may evolve dramatically
over time, and earlier analysis of a database may grow stale. For example, tasks like identifying trending
news topics critically rely on dynamic data and dynamic analysis. To harness the value of growing databases
and keep up with data analysis needs, guarantees of machine learning algorithms and other statistical tools
must apply not just to fixed databases but also to dynamic databases.
Learning algorithms must deal with highly personal data in contexts such as wearable health data,
browsing behavior, and GPS location data. In these settings, privacy concerns are particularly important.
Analysis of sensitive data without formal privacy guarantees has led to numerous privacy violations in
practice, for tasks such as recommender systems [CKN+11], targeted advertising [Kor10], data anonymization
[NS08], and deep learning [HAPC17].
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In the last decade, a growing literature on differential privacy has developed to address these concerns
(see, e.g., [DR14]). First defined by [DMNS06], differential privacy gives a mathematically rigorous worst-
case bound on the maximum amount of information that can be learned about any one individual’s data
from the output of an algorithm. The theoretical computer science community has been prolific in designing
differentially private algorithms that provide accuracy guarantees for a wide variety of machine learning
problems (see [JLE14] for a survey). Differentially private algorithms have also begun to be implemented
in practice by major organizations such as Apple, Google, Uber, and the United Status Census Bureau.
However, the vast majority of differentially private algorithms are designed only for static databases, and
are ill-equipped to handle new environments with growing data.
This paper presents a collection of tools for machine learning and other types of data analysis that guar-
antee differential privacy and accuracy as the underlying databases grow arbitrarily large. We give both
a general technique and a specific algorithm for adaptive analysis of dynamically growing databases. Our
general technique is illustrated by two algorithms that schedule black box access to some algorithm that op-
erates on a fixed database, to generically transform private and accurate algorithms for static databases into
private and accurate algorithms for dynamically growing databases. Our specific algorithm directly adapts
the private multiplicative weights algorithm of [HR10] to the dynamic setting, maintaining the accuracy
guarantee of the static setting through unbounded data growth.
1.1 Our Results
Here we outline our two sets of results for adaptive analysis of dynamically growing databases. Throughout
the paper, we refer to the setting in which a database is fixed for the life of the analysis as the static setting,
and we refer to the setting in which a database is accumulating new data entries while the analysis is ongoing
as the dynamic setting.
Our first set of results consists of two methods for generically transforming a black box algorithm that
is private and accurate in the static setting into an algorithm that is private and accurate in the dynamic
setting. BBScheduler reruns the black box algorithm every time the database increases in size by a
small multiplicative factor, and it provides privacy and accuracy guarantees that are independent of the
total number of queries (Theorem 10). BBScheduler calls each successive run of the black box algorithm
with an exponentially shrinking privacy parameter to achieve any desired total privacy loss. The time-
independent accuracy guarantee arises from the calibration of the decreasing per-run privacy parameters
with the increasing database size. We instantiate this scheduler using the SmallDB algorithm [BLR08] for
answering k linear queries on a database of size n over a universe of size N . With our scheduler we can answer
an infinite amount of queries from a linear query class of size k on a growing database with starting size n
over universe of size N . The static and dynamic settings have the following respective accuracy guarantees
(Theorem 7, [BLR08]; Theorem 9):
αs = O
(
logN log k
ǫn
)1/3
αd = O
(
logN log k
ǫn
)1/5
Our second transformation, BBImprover, runs the black box every time new entries are added to the
database, and it yields accuracy guarantees that improve as more data accumulate. This algorithm is well-
suited for problems where data points are sampled from a distribution, where one would expect the accuracy
guarantees of static analysis to improve with the size of the sample. We apply this scheduler to private
empirical risk minimization (ERM) algorithms to output classifiers with generalization error that improves
as the training database grows (Theorem 12).
The following informal theorem statement summarizes our results for BBScheduler (Theorem 10) and
BBImprover (Theorem 13). These results show that almost any private and accurate algorithm can be
rerun at appropriate points of data growth with minimal loss of accuracy. Throughout the paper, we use n to
denote the starting size of the database. The O˜ below hides poly log(n) terms, and we suppress dependence
on parameters other than ǫ and n, (e.g., data universe size N , number of queries k, failure probability β).
Section 3 also provides an improved (ǫ, δ)-private version of BBScheduler.
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Theorem 1 (Informal). Let M be an ǫ-differentially private algorithm that is (α, β)-accurate for an input
query stream for some α = O˜
((
1
ǫn
)p)
and constant p. Then
1. BBScheduler running M is ǫ-differentially private and (α, β)-accurate for α = O˜
((
1
ǫn
)p/(2p+1))
.
2. BBImprover runningM is (ǫ, δ)-differentially private and is ({αt}t≥n, β)-accurate for αt = O˜
((√
log(1/δ)
ǫ
√
t
)p)
,
where αt bounds the error when the database is size t ≥ n.
Our second set of results opens the black box to increase accuracy and adaptivity by modifying the
private multiplicative weights (PMW) algorithm [HR10], a broadly useful algorithm for privately answering
an adaptive stream of k linear queries with accuracy α = O( logN log kǫn )
1/3. Our modification for growing
databases (PMWG) considers all available data when any query arrives, and it suffers asymptotically no
additional accuracy cost relative to the static setting.
The static PMW algorithm answers an adaptive stream of queries while maintaining a public histogram
reflecting the current estimate of the database given all previously answered queries. It categorizes incoming
queries as either easy or hard, suffering significant privacy loss only for the hard queries. Hardness is
determined with respect to the public histogram: upon receipt of a query for which the histogram provides
a significantly different answer than the true database, PMW classifies this as a hard query, and it updates
the histogram in a way that moves it closer to a correct answer on that query. The number of hard queries is
bounded using a potential argument. Potential is defined as the relative entropy between the database and
the public histogram. This quantity is initially bounded, it decreases by a substantial amount after every
hard query, and it never increases.
The main challenge in adapting PMW to the dynamic setting is that we can no longer use this potential
argument to bound the number of hard queries. This is because the relative entropy between the database
and the public histogram can increase as new data arrive. In the worst case, PMW can learn the database
with high accuracy (using many hard queries), and then adversarial data growth can change the composition
of the database dramatically, allowing for even more hard queries on the new data than is possible in the
static setting. Instead, we modify PMW so that the public histogram updates not only in response to hard
queries but also in response to new data arrivals. By treating the new data as coming from a uniform
distribution, these latter updates incur no additional privacy loss, and they mitigate the relative entropy
increase due to new data. This modification allows us to maintain the accuracy guarantee of the static
setting through unbounded data growth. The following informal theorem is a statement of our main result
for PMWG (Theorem 14). As with the static PMW algorithm, we can improve the exponent in the bound
to 1/2 if our goal is (ǫ, δ)-privacy for δ > 0 (Theorem 17).
Theorem 2 (Informal). PMWG is ǫ-differentially private and (α, β)-accurate for any stream of up to
κ · exp(
√
t/n) queries when the database is any size t ≥ n for some α = O
((
logN log κ
ǫn
)1/3)
.
Along the way, we develop extensions of several static differentially private algorithms to the dynamic
setting. These algorithms are presented in Appendix C, and may be of independent interest for future work
on the design of differentially private algorithms for growing databases.
1.2 Related Work
Online Learning. Our setting of dynamically growing databases is most closely related to online learning,
where a learner plays a game with an adversary over many rounds. On each round t, the adversary first gives
the learner some input, then the learner chooses an action at and receives loss function Lt chosen by the
adversary, and experiences loss Lt(at). There is a vast literature on online learning, including several works
on differentially private online learning [JKT12, ST13, AS17]. In those settings, a database is a sequence of
loss functions, and neighboring databases differ on a single loss function. While online learning resembles
the dynamic database setting, there are several key differences. Performance bounds in the online setting are
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in terms of regret, which is a cumulative error term. On the other hand, we seek additive error bounds that
hold for all of our answers. Such bounds are not possible in general for online learning, since the inputs are
adversarial and the true answer is not known. In our case, we can achieve such bounds because even though
queries are presented adversarially, we have access to the query’s true answer. Instead of a cumulative error
bound, we manage a cumulative privacy budget.
Private Learning on a Static Database. There is a prominent body of work designing differentially
private algorithms in the static setting for a wide variety of machine learning problems (see [JLE14] for a
survey). These private and accurate algorithms can be used as black boxes in our schedulers BBScheduler
and BBImprover. In this paper, we pay particular attention to the problem of private empirical risk
minimization (ERM) as an instantiation for our algorithms. Private ERM has been previously studied by
[CMS11, KST+12, BST14]; we compare our accuracy bounds in the dynamic setting to their static bounds
in Table 1.1
Private Adaptive Analysis of a Static Database. If we wish to answer multiple queries on the
same database by independently perturbing each answer, then the noise added to each answer must scale
linearly with the number of queries to maintain privacy, meaning only O(n) queries can be answered with
meaningful privacy and accuracy. If the queries are known in advance, however, [BLR08] showed how to an-
swer exponentially many queries relative to the database size for fixed ǫ and α. Later, Private Multiplicative
Weights (PMW) [HR10] achieved a similar result in the interactive setting, where the analyst can adaptively
decide which queries to ask based on previous outputs, with accuracy guarantees close to the sample error.
A recent line of work [DFH+15, CLN+16, BNS+16] showed deep connections between differential privacy
and adaptive data analysis of a static database. Our results would allow analysts to apply these tools on
dynamically growing databases.
Private Non-Adaptive Analysis of a Dynamic Database. Differential privacy for growing databases
has been studied for a limited class of problems. Both [DNPR10] and [CSS11] adapted the notion of differ-
ential privacy to streaming environments in a setting where each entry in the database is a single bit, and
bits arrive one per unit time. [DNPR10] and [CSS11] design differentially private algorithms for an analyst
to maintain an approximately accurate count of the number 1-bits seen thus far in the stream. This tech-
nique was later extended by [ST13] to maintain private sums of real vectors arriving online in a stream. We
note that both of these settings correspond to only a single query repeatedly asked on a dynamic database,
precluding meaningful adaptive analysis. To contrast, we consider adaptive analysis of dynamically growing
databases, allowing the analyst exponentially many predicate queries to choose from as the database grows.
2 Preliminaries
All algorithms in this paper take as input databases over some fixed data universe X of finite size N .
Our algorithms and analyses represent a finite database D ∈ Xn equivalently as a fractional histogram
x ∈ ∆(X ) ⊆ RN , where xi is the fraction of the database of type i ∈ [N ]. When we say a database x ∈ ∆(X )
has size n, this means that for each i ∈ [N ] there exists some ni ∈ N such that xi = ni/n.
If an algorithm operates over a single fixed database, we refer to this as the static setting. For the
dynamic setting, we define a database stream to be a sequence of databases X = {xt}t≥n starting with a
database xn of size n at time t = n and increasing by one data entry per time step so that t always denotes
both a time and the size of the database at that time. Our dynamic algorithms also take a parameter n,
which denotes the starting size of the database.
We consider algorithms that answer real-valued queries f : RN → R with particular focus on linear
queries. A linear query assigns a weight to each entry depending on its type and averages these weights over
the database. We can interpret a linear query as a vector f ∈ [0, 1]N and write the answer to the query on
database x ∈ ∆(X ) as 〈f, x〉, f(x), or x(f), depending on context. For f viewed as a vector, f i denotes the
ith entry. We note that an important special case of linear queries are counting queries, which calculate the
proportion of entries in a database satisfying some boolean predicate over X .
1To get the static bounds, we use Appendix D of [BST14], which converts bounds on expected excess empirical risk to high
probability bounds.
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Many of the algorithms we study allow queries to be chosen adaptively, i.e., the algorithm accepts a
stream of queries F = {fj}kj=1 where the choice of fj+1 can depend on the previous j queries and answers.
For the dynamic setting, we doubly index a stream of queries as F = {ft,:}t≥n = {{ft,j}ℓtj=1}t≥n so that t
denotes the size of the database at the time ft,j is received, and j = 1, . . . , ℓt indexes the queries received
when the database is size t.
The algorithms studied produce outputs of various forms. To evaluate accuracy, we assume that an
output y of an algorithm for query class F (possibly specified by an adaptively chosen query stream) can be
interpreted as a function over F , i.e., we write y(f) to denote the answer to f ∈ F based on the mechanism’s
output. We seek to develop mechanisms that are accurate in the following sense.
Definition 1 (Accuracy in the static setting). For α, β > 0, an algorithm M is (α, β)-accurate for query
class F if for any input database x ∈ ∆(X ), the algorithm outputs y such that |f(x)− y(f)| ≤ α for all
f ∈ F with probability at least 1− β.
In the dynamic setting, accuracy must be with respect to the current database, and the bounds may be
parametrized by time.
Definition 2 (Accuracy in the dynamic setting). For αn, αn+1, · · · > 0 and β > 0, an algorithm M is
({αt}t≥n, β)-accurate for query stream F = {ft,:}t≥n if for any input database stream X = {xt}t≥n, the
algorithm outputs y such that |ft,j(xt)− y(ft,j)| ≤ αt for all ft,j ∈ F with probability at least 1− β.
2.1 Differential Privacy and Composition Theorems
Differential privacy in the static setting requires that an algorithm produce similar outputs on neighboring
databases x ∼ x′, which differ by a single entry. In the dynamic setting, differential privacy requires similar
outputs on neighboring database streams X,X ′ that satisfy that for some t ≥ n, xτ = x′τ for τ = n, . . . , t− 1
and xτ ∼ x′τ for τ ≥ t.2 In the definition below, a pair of neighboring inputs refers to a pair of neighboring
databases in the static setting or a pair of neighboring database streams in the dynamic setting.
Definition 3 (Differential privacy [DMNS06]). For ǫ, δ > 0, an algorithm M is (ǫ, δ)-differentially private
if for any pair of neighboring inputs x, x′ and any subset S ⊆ Range(M),
Pr[M(x) ∈ S] ≤ eǫ · Pr[M(x′) ∈ S] + δ.
When δ = 0, we will say that M is ǫ-differentially private.
We note that in the dynamic setting, an element in Range(M) is an entire (potentially infinite) transcript
of outputs that may be produced by M.
Differential privacy is typically achieved by adding random noise that scales with the sensitivity of
the computation being performed. The sensitivity of any real-valued query f : ∆(X ) → R is the max-
imum change in the query’s answer due to the change of a single entry in the database, denoted ∆f =
maxx∼x′|f(x)− f(x′)|. We note that a linear query on a database of size n has sensitivity 1/n.
The following composition theorems quantify how the privacy guarantee degrades as additional compu-
tations are performed on a database.
Theorem 3 (Basic composition [DMNS06]). LetMi be an ǫi-differentially private algorithm for all i ∈ [k].
Then the composition M defined as M(x) = (Mi(x))ki=1 is ǫ-differentially private for ǫ =
∑k
i=1 ǫi.
Theorem 3 is useful to combine many differentially private algorithms to still achieve (ǫ, 0)-differential
privacy. Assuming the privacy loss in each mechanism is the same, the privacy loss from composing k
mechanisms scales with k. There is an advanced composition theorem due to [DRV10] that improves the
privacy loss to roughly
√
k by relaxing from (ǫ, 0)-differential privacy to (ǫ, δ)-differential privacy. However,
advanced composition does not extend cleanly to the case where eachMi has different ǫi. Instead we use a
2Note that this definition is equivalent to the definition of neighboring streams in [CPWV16].
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composition theorem based on concentrated differential privacy (CDP) of [BS16]. This gives us the flexibility
to compose differentially private mechanisms with different ǫi to achieve (ǫ, δ)-differential privacy, where ǫ
scales comparably to the
√
k bound of advanced composition.
Theorem 4 (CDP composition, Corollary of [BS16]). Let Mi be a ǫi-differentially private algorithm
for all i ∈ [k]. Then the composition of all Mi is (ǫ, δ)-differentially private for ǫ = 12 (
∑k
i=1 ǫ
2
i ) +√
2(
∑k
i=1 ǫ
2
i ) log(1/δ). In particular, for δ ≤ e−1 and
∑k
i=1 ǫ
2
i ≤ 1, we have ǫ ≤ 2
√
(
∑k
i=1 ǫ
2
i ) log(1/δ).
Proof. The statement follows from the three following propositions in [BS16]:
1. A mechanism that is ǫ-DP is 12ǫ
2-zCDP.
2. Composition of ρ1-zCDP and ρ2-zCDP is a (ρ1 + ρ2)-zCDP mechanism
3. A ρ-zCDP mechanism is (ρ+ 2
√
ρ log(1/δ), δ)-DP for any δ > 0.
Theorem 4 shows that composing ǫi-differentially private algorithms results in (ǫ, δ)-differential priacy,
where the privacy ǫ scales with the ℓ2-norm of the vector (ǫi)
k
i=1 and log
1/2(1/δ).
2.2 Empirical Risk Minimization
Empirical risk minimization (ERM) is one of the most fundamental tasks in machine learning. The task is
to find a good classifier θ ∈ C from a set of classifiers C, given a database x of size n sampled from some
distribution P over X = Rd and loss function L : C × ∆(X ) → R. The loss L of a classifier θ on a finite
database xn = {z1, . . . , zn} with respect to some L : C × X → R is defined as L(θ;xn) = 1n
∑n
i=1 L(θ; zi).
Common choices for L include 0− 1 loss, hinge loss, and squared loss.
We seek to find a θˆ with small excess empirical risk, defined as,
Rˆn(θˆ) = L(θˆ;xn)−min
θ∈C
L(θ;xn). (2.1)
In convex ERM, we assume that L(·;x) is convex for all x ∈ X and that C is a convex set. We will
also assume that X ⊆ Rp. Convex ERM is convenient because finding a suitable θˆ reduces to a convex
optimization problem, for which there exist many fast algorithms. Some examples of ERM include finding
a d-dimensional median and SVM.
ERM is useful due to its connections to the true risk, also known as the generalization error, defined as
R(θ) = Ex∼P [L(θ;x)]. That is, the loss function will be low in expectation on a new data point sampled
from P . We can also define the excess risk of a classifier θˆ:
ExcessRisk(θˆ) = E
x∼P
[
L(θˆ;x)
]
−min
θ∈C
E
x∼P
[L(θ;x)] .
ERM finds classifiers with low excess empirical risk, which in turn often have low excess risk. The following
theorem relates the two. For completeness, we first give some definitions relating to convex empirical risk
minimization. A convex body C is a set such that for all x, y ∈ C and all λ ∈ [0, 1], λx+(1−λ)y ∈ C. A vector
v is a subgradient of a function L at x0 if for all x ∈ C, L(x)−L(x0) ≥ 〈v, x− x0〉. A function L : C → R is
G-Lipschitz if for all pairs x, y ∈ C, |L(x)− L(y)| ≤ G ||x− y||2. L is ∆-strongly convex on C if for all x ∈ C
and all subgradients z at x and all y ∈ C, we have L(y) ≥ L(x) + 〈z, y− x〉+ ∆2 ||y − x||22. L is B-smooth on
C if for all x ∈ C, for all subgradients z at x and for all y ∈ C, we have L(y) ≤ L(x)+ 〈z, y−x〉+ B2 ||y − x||22.
We denote the diameter of a convex set C by ||C||2 = argmaxx,y∈C ||x− y||2.
Theorem 5 ([SSSSS09]). For G-Lipschitz and ∆-strongly convex loss functions, with probability at least
1− γ over the randomness of sampling the data set xn, the following holds:
ExcessRisk(θˆ) ≤
√
2G2
∆
Rˆn(θˆ) + 4G
2
γ∆n
.
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Moreover, we can generalize this result to any convex and Lipschitz loss function L by defining a reg-
ularized version of L, called L˜, such that L˜(θ;x) = L(θ;x) + ∆2 ||θ||22. Then L˜ is (L + ||C||2)-Lipschitz and
∆-strongly convex. Also note that:
ExcessRiskL(θ) ≤ ExcessRiskL˜(θ) +
∆
2
||C||22 .
Thus, ERM finds classifiers with low true risk in these settings. The following result for differentially private
static ERM is due to [BST14] and provides a baseline for our work in the dynamic setting.
Theorem 6 (Static ERM [BST14]). There exists an algorithm ERM(x, C,L, ǫ, α, β, n) for X ⊆ Rd that is
ǫ-differentially private and (α, β)-accurate for static ERM as long as ||C||2 = 1, L is 1-Lipschitz, and for
sufficiently large constant C,
α ≥ C d log(1/β) log log(1/β)
ǫn
.
2.3 SmallDB
The SmallDB algorithm [BLR08] is a differentially private algorithm for generating synthetic databases.
For any input database x of size n, class F of linear queries, and accuracy parameter α, the algorithm
samples a database y of size log|F|α with exponential bias towards databases that closely approximate x on
all the queries in F . The main strength of SmallDB is its ability to accurately answer exponentially many
linear queries while still preserving privacy, captured in the following guarantee.
Theorem 7 (Static SmallDB [BLR08]). The algorithm SmallDB(x,F , ǫ, α, β, n) is ǫ-differentially private,
and it is (α, β)-accurate for linear query class F of size |F| = k as long as for sufficiently large constant C,
α ≥ C
(
logN log k + log(1/β)
ǫn
)1/3
.
This bound on α shows that for a fixed accuracy goal, the privacy parameter can decrease proportionally
as the size of the input database size increases.
2.4 Private Multiplicative Weights
The static private multiplicative weights (PMW) algorithm [HR10] answers an adaptive stream of linear
queries while maintaining a public histogram y, which reflects the current estimate of the static database
x given all previously answered queries. Critical to the performance of the algorithm is that it uses the
public histogram to categorize incoming queries as either easy or hard, and it updates the histogram after
hard queries in a way that moves it closer to a correct answer on that query. The number of hard queries is
bounded using a potential argument, where the potential function is defined as the relative entropy between
the database and the public histogram, i.e., RE (x||y) = ∑i∈[N ] xi log(xi/yi). This quantity is initially
bounded, it decreases by a substantial amount after every hard query, and it never increases. The following
guarantee illustrates that this technique allows for non-trivial accuracy for exponentially many adaptively
chosen linear queries.3
Theorem 8 (Static PMW [HR10]). The algorithm PMW(x, F, ǫ, δ, α, β, n) is (ǫ, δ)-differentially private, and
it is (α, β)-accurate for k adaptively chosen linear queries F as long as for sufficiently large constant C
α ≥


C
(
logN log(k/β)
ǫn
)1/3
for δ = 0
C
(
log1/2 N log(k/β) log(1/δ)
ǫn
)1/2
for δ > 0
3The bounds cited here are from the updated version in http://mrtz.org/papers/HR10mult.pdf
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This result is nearly tight in that any ǫ-differentially private algorithm that answers k adaptively chosen
linear queries on a database of size n must have error α ≥ Ω(( log(N/n) log kǫn )1/2) [HR10]. PMW runs in time
linear in the data universe size N . If the incoming data entries are drawn from a distribution that satisfies
a mild smoothness condition, a compact representation of the data universe can significantly reduce the
runtime [HR10]. The same idea applies to our modification of PMW for the dynamic setting presented in
Section 4, but we only present the inefficient and fully general algorithm.
3 Extending Accuracy Guarantees to Growing Databases
In this section, we give two schemes for answering a stream of queries on a growing database, given black
box access to a differentially private algorithm for the static setting. Our results extend the privacy and
accuracy guarantees of these static algorithms to the dynamic setting, even when data growth is unbounded.
We also instantiate our results with important mechanisms for machine learning that are private in the static
setting.
In Section 3.1, we provide an algorithm BBScheduler for scheduling repeated runs of a static algorithm.
BBScheduler is differentially private and provides (α, β)-accurate answers to all queries, for α that does
not change as the database grows or as more queries are asked. In Section 3.2, we provide a second algorithm
BBImprover that allows the accuracy guarantee to improve as more data accumulate. This result is well-
suited for problems where data points are sampled from a distribution, where one would expect the accuracy
guarantees of static analysis to improve with the size of the sample. This algorithm is differentially private
and ({αt}, β)-accurate, where αt is diminishing inverse polynomially in t (i.e., approaching perfect accuracy
as the database grows large). We also instantiate our results with important mechanisms for machine learning
that are private in the static setting.
For ease of presentation, we restrict our results to accuracy of real-valued queries, but the algorithms we
propose could be applied to settings with more general notions of accuracy or to settings where the black
box algorithm itself can change across time steps, adding to the adaptivity of this scheme.
3.1 Fixed Accuracy as Data Accumulate
In this section, we give results for using a private and accurate algorithm for the static setting as a black
box to solve the analogous problem in the dynamic setting. Our general purpose algorithm BBScheduler
treats a static algorithm as a black box endowed with privacy and accuracy guarantees, and it reruns the
black box whenever the database grows by a small multiplicative factor. For concreteness, we first show in
Section 3.1.1 how our results apply to the case of the well-known SmallDB algorithm, described in Section
2.3. Then in Section 3.1.2, we present the more general algorithm.
3.1.1 Application: SmallDB for Growing Databases
Before presenting our result in full generality, we instantiate it on SmallDB for concreteness, and show how
to extend SmallDB to the dynamic setting. Recall from Section 2.3 that the static SmallDB algorithm
takes in a database x, a class of linear queries F , and privacy parameter ǫ, and accuracy parameters α,
β. The algorithm is ǫ-differentially private and outputs a smaller database y of size log |F|α2 , from which all
queries in F can be answered with (α, β)-accuracy.
In the dynamic setting, we receive a database streamX = {xt}t≥n, a stream of queries F = {{ft,j}ℓtj=1}t≥n
from some class of linear queries F , parameters ǫ, α, β, and starting database size n. We still require ǫ-
differential privacy and (α, β)-accuracy on the entire stream of queries, for α that remains fixed as the
database grows.
We design the SmallDBG algorithm that works by running SmallDB at times {ti}∞i=0, where ti =
(1 + γ)in for some γ < 1 chosen by the algorithm.4 We will label the time interval from ti to ti+1 − 1
4For simplicity, we will assume that (1 + γ)in is integral for for all i. We can replace (1+ γ)in with ⌈(1 + γ)in⌉ and achieve
the same bounds up to a small sub-constant additive factor.
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as the ith epoch. At the start of the ith epoch, we call SmallDB on the current database with privacy
parameter ǫi, and output a synthetic database yi that will be used to answer queries received during epoch
i.5 SmallDBG provides the following guarantee:
Theorem 9. SmallDBG(X,F,F , ǫ, α, β, n) is ǫ-differentially private and can answer all queries in query
stream F from query class F of size |F| = k with (α, β)-accuracy6 for sufficiently large constant C and
α ≥ C
(
logN log k log(1/β)
ǫn
)1/5
.
Note that there is no bound on the number of queries or on the database growth. The algorithm can provide
answers to an arbitrary number of linear queries at any time.
There are two key technical properties that allow this result to hold. First, each data point added to a
database of size t can only change a linear query by roughly 1/t. Thus, using synthetic database yi from
time ti for queries before time (1 + γ)ti will incur extra additive error of at most γ. Second, since the ti’s
grow by a multiplicative factor each time, the epochs become exponentially far apart and the total privacy
loss (due to composition of multiple calls of SmallDB) is not too large.
3.1.2 A General Black Box Scheduler
The results for SmallDBG are an instantiation of a more general result that extends the privacy and accu-
racy guarantees of any static algorithm to the dynamic setting. Our general purpose algorithm BBSched-
uler treats a static algorithm as a black box endowed with privacy and accuracy guarantees, and reruns
the black box whenever the database grows by a factor of (1 + γ). Due to the generality of this approach,
BBScheduler can be applied to any algorithm that satisfies ǫ-differential privacy and (α, β)-accuracy, as
specified in Definition 4.
Definition 4 ((p, g)-black box). An algorithm M(x, ǫ, α, β, n) is a (p, g)-black box for a class of linear
queries F if it is (ǫ, 0)-differentially private and with probability 1 − β it outputs y : F → R such that
|y(f)− xn(f)| ≤ α for every f ∈ F when α ≥ g
(
log(1/β)
ǫn
)p
for some g that is independent of ǫ, n, β.
The parameter g is intended to capture dependence on domain-specific parameters that affect the accuracy
guarantee. For example, SmallDB is a (1/3, (64 logN log k)1/3)-black box for an arbitrary set F of k linear
queries, and its output y is a synthetic database of size log k/α2.
Our generic algorithm BBScheduler (Algorithm 1) will run the black box M at times {ti}∞i=0 for
ti = (1 + γ)
in with γ < 1 that depends on p and g. The ith M call will have parameters ǫi and βi, and will
use yi to answer queries received during the i
th epoch, from ti to ti+1 − 1.
We now state our main result for BBScheduler:
Theorem 10. LetM be a (p, g)-black box for query class F . Then for any database stream X and stream
of linear queries F over F , BBScheduler(X,F,M, ǫ, δ, β, n, p, g) is (ǫ, δ)-differentially private for ǫ < 1 and
(α, β)-accurate for sufficiently large constant C and
α ≥


Cg
1
2p+1
(
log(1/β)
ǫn
) p
2p+1
if δ = 0
Cg
1
1.5p+1
(√
log(1/δ) log(1/β)
ǫn
) p
1.5p+1
if δ > 0
.
5Note that SmallDBG will still give similar guarantees if the query class changes over time, provided that the black box
SmallDB at time ti uses the correct query class Fi for times ti to ti+1 − 1. We could think of this as SmallDBG receiving a
SmallDB(·,Fi, ·, ·, ·) as its black box in epoch i.
6With a more careful analysis, one can show that the numerator in this accuracy bound can be taken to be 16 logN log |F|+
4 log 1
β
to match the form of the bound in Theorem 7.
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Algorithm 1 BBScheduler(X,F,M, ǫ, δ, β, n, p, g)
if δ = 0 then ⊲ Set growth between epochs
Let γ ← g 12p+1
(
log 1β
ǫn
) p
2p+1
else δ > 0
Let γ ← g 11.5p+1
(
log 1β
ǫn
) p
1.5p+1
end if
Let i← −1
for t← n, n+ 1, ... do
if t = (1 + γ)i+1n then ⊲ Begin new epoch when database has grown sufficiently
i← i+ 1
if δ = 0 then
Let ǫi ← γ
2(i+1)
(1+γ)i+2 ǫ
else δ > 0
Let ǫi ← γ
1.5(i+1)
(1+γ)i+1.5
ǫ
3
√
log(1/δ)
end if
Let βi ←
(
β
1+β
)i+1
Let αi ← g
(
log 1βi
ǫi(1+γ)in
)p
Let yi ←M (xt, ǫi, αi, βi) ⊲ Rerun M for new epoch on new parameters
end if
for j ← 1, ..., ℓt do
Output yi(ft,j) ⊲ Answer queries at time t with the output of M from current epoch
end for
end for
Note that this algorithm can provide two different types accuracy bounds. If we desire (ǫ, 0)-differential
privacy, then the accuracy bounds are slightly weaker, while if we allow (ǫ, δ)-differential privacy, we can get
improved accuracy bounds at the cost of a small loss in privacy. The only differences are how the algorithm
sets γ and ǫi. For a complete proof of Theorem 10, see Appendix A. We present a proof sketch below.
Proof sketch of Theorem 10. BBScheduler inherits its privacy guarantee from the black box M and the
composition properties of differential privacy. When δ = 0, we use Theorem 3 (Basic Composition). When
δ > 0, we use Theorem 4 (CDP Composition). These two cases require different settings of γ and ǫi for their
respective composition theorems to yield the desired privacy guarantee.
To prove the accuracy of BBScheduler we require the following lemma, which bounds the additive
error introduced by answering queries that arrive mid-epoch using the slightly outdated database from the
end of the previous epoch.
Lemma 11. For any linear query f and databases xt and xτ from a database streamX , where τ ∈ [t, (1+γ)t]
for some γ ∈ (0, 1),
|xτ (f)− xt(f)| ≤ γ
1 + γ
.
We combine this lemma with the algorithm’s choice of γi to show that with probability at least 1 − βi,
all mid-epoch queries are answered α-accurately with respect to the current database. The final step is to
bound the overall failure probability of the algorithm. Taking a union bound over the failure probabilities
in each epoch, we complete the proof by showing that
∑∞
i=0 βi ≤ β.
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3.2 Improving Accuracy as Data Accumulate
In the previous section, our accuracy bounds stayed fixed as the database size increased. However, in some
applications it is more natural for accuracy bounds to improve as the database grows. For instance, in
empirical risk minimization (defined in Section 2.2) the database can be thought of as a set of training
examples. As the database grows, we expect to be able to find classifiers with shrinking empirical risk, which
implies shrinking generalization error. More generally, when database entries are random samples from a
distribution, one would expect accuracy of analysis to improve with more samples.
In this section, we extend our black box scheduler framework to allow for accuracy guarantees that
improve as data accumulate. Accuracy improvements over BBScheduler are typically only seen once the
database is sufficiently large. We first instantiate our result for empirical risk minimization in Section 3.2.1,
and then present the general result in Section 3.2.2.
3.2.1 Application: Empirical Risk Minimization for Growing Databases
In the static setting, an algorithm for empirical risk minimization (ERM) takes in a database x of size n,
and outputs a classifier from some set C that minimizes a loss function L on the sample data. Increasing
the size of the training sample will improve accuracy of the classifier, as measured by excess empirical risk
(Equation (2.1)). Given the importance of ERM, it is no surprise that a number of previous works have
considered differentially private ERM in the static setting [CMS11, KST+12, BST14].
For ERM in the dynamic setting, we want a classifier yt at every time t ≥ n that achieves low empirical
risk on the current database, and we want the empirical risk of our classifiers to improve over time, as in
the static case. Note that the dynamic variant of the problem is strictly harder because we must produce
classifiers at every time step, rather than waiting for sufficiently many new samples to arrive. Releasing
classifiers at every time step degrades privacy, and thus requires more noise to be added to preserve the same
overall privacy guarantee. Nonetheless, we will compare our private growing algorithm, which simultaneously
provides accuracy bounds for every time step from n to infinity, to private static algorithms, which are only
run once.
In ERMG, our algorithm for ERM in the dynamic setting, the sole query of interest is the loss function
L evaluated on the current database. At each time t, ERMG receives a single query ft, where ft evaluated
on the database is xt(ft) = minθ∈C L(θ;xt). The black box outputs yt, which is a classifier from C that can
be used to evaluate the single query yt(ft) = L(yt;xt). Our accuracy guarantee at time t is the difference
between yt(ft) and xt(ft):
αt = L(yt;xt)−min
θ∈C
L(θ;xt).
This expression is identical to the excess empirical risk Rˆt(yt) defined in Equation (2.1). Thus accurate an-
swers to queries are equivalent to minimizing empirical risk. Our accuracy bounds are stated in Theorem 12.
Theorem 12. Let c > 0, and L be a convex loss function that is 1-Lipschitz over some set C with ||C||2 = 1.
Then for any stream of databases X with points in Rd, ERMG(X,L, C, ǫ, δ, β, n) is (ǫ, δ)-differentially private
and with probability at least 1− β produces classifiers yt for all t ≥ n that for sufficiently large constant C
have excess empirical risk bounded by
Rˆt(yt) ≤ C d log(1/β)
√
log(1/δ)√
cǫt
1
2−c
.
If L is also ∆-strongly convex,
Rˆt(yt) ≤ C d
2 log2(1/β) log(1/δ)√
c∆ǫ2t1−c
.
The results in Theorem 12 all come from instantiating (the more general) Theorem 13 stated in the
next section, and the proof is in Appendix A.2. We use the static (ǫ, 0)-differentially private algorithms of
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[BST14] as black boxes. The differing assumptions on L allow us to use different (p, g)-black boxes with
different input parameters in each case. We compare our growing bounds to these static bounds in Table 1.7
Since ERMG provides (ǫ, δ)-differential privacy, we also include static (ǫ, δ)-differential privacy bounds for
comparison in Table 1. The static bounds are optimal in d, t, and ǫ up to log factors.
Assumptions Static (ǫ, 0)-DP [BST14] Static (ǫ, δ)-DP [BST14] Dynamic (ǫ, δ)-DP (our results)
1-Lipschitz and
||C||2 = 1
d log 1β
ǫt
√
d log2(t/δ) log 1β
ǫt
d
√
log(1/δ) log 1β√
cǫt
1
2
−c
... and ∆-
strongly convex
(implies ∆ ≤ 2)
d2(log t) log2 1β
∆ǫ2t2
d log3(t/δ) log2 1β
∆ǫ2t2
d2 log(1/δ) log2 1β√
c∆ǫ2t1−c
Table 1: Comparison of excess empirical risk upper bounds in the static case versus the dynamic case for
a database of size t under differing assumptions on the loss function L. Database entries are sampled from
R
d, and c is any positive constant. We ignore leading multiplicative constants and factors of log log 1β in the
static bounds. As in [BST14], we assume δ < 1/t for simplicity.
Note that the bounds we get for the growing setting have the same dependence on ǫ, β, and ∆ and
better dependence on δ. The dependence on t in our bound is roughly the square root of that in the static
bounds. Compared to the static (ǫ, 0)-differential privacy bounds, our dependence on d is the same, while
the dependence is squared relative to the static (ǫ, δ)-differential privacy bounds.
Given that the growing setting is strictly harder than the static setting, it is somewhat surprising that
we have no loss in most of the parameters, and only minimal loss in the size of the database t. Thus, for
ERM, performance in the static setting largely carries over to the growing setting.
3.2.2 A General Black Box Scheduler for Improving Accuracy
In this section we describe the general BBImprover algorithm, which achieves accuracy guarantees in the
dynamic setting that improve as the database size grows. The algorithm takes in a private and accurate
static black box M, which it re-runs on the current database at every time step. We require the following
more general definition of black box to state the privacy and accuracy guarantees of BBImprover.
Definition 5 (Definition of (p, p′, p′′, g)-black box). An algorithmM(x, ǫ, α, β, n) is a (p, p′, p′′, g)-black box
for a class of linear queries F if it is (ǫ, 0)-differentially private and with probability 1 − β it outputs some
y : F → R such that |y(f)− xn(f)| ≤ α for every f ∈ F when α ≥ g
(
1
ǫn
)p
logp
′′
n logp
′
(1/β) for some g that
is independent of ǫ, n, β.
The algorithm BBImprover (Algorithm 2) will run the black boxM after each new data point arrives,
starting at time t = n, using time-dependent parameters ǫt, αt, βt. The output yt will be used to answer all
queries that arrive at time t.
The following theorem is our main result for BBImprover, which states that the algorithm is differ-
entially private and (αt, β)-accurate for αt that decreases inverse polynomially in t. The complete proof is
given in Appendix A.
Theorem 13. Let c > 0 and let M be a (p, p′, p′′, g)-black box for query class F . Then for any database
stream X and stream of linear queries F over F , BBImprover(X,F,M, ǫ, δ, β, n, p, p′, p′′, g, c) is (ǫ, δ)-
7To get the static bounds, we use Appendix D of [BST14], which converts bounds on expected excess empirical risk to high
probability bounds.
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Algorithm 2 BBImprover(X,F,M, ǫ, δ, α, β, n, p, p′, p′′, g, c)
for t← n, n+ 1, ... do
Let ǫt ←
√
c
3
√
log(1/δ)
ǫ
t
1
2
+c
Let βt ← β2t2
Let αt ← g
(
1
ǫit
)p
logp
′′
n logp
′ 1
β
Let yt ←M(xt, ǫt, αt, βt)
for j ← 1, ..., ℓt do
Output yt(ft,j)
end for
end for
differentially private for ǫ < 1 and ({αt}t≥n, β)-accurate for sufficiently large constant C and
αt = Cg log
p′(1/β)
(√
log(1/δ)√
cǫt
1
2−2c
)p
.
The free parameter c in Theorem 13 can be any positive constant, and should be set to an arbitrarily
small constant for the algorithm to achieve the best asymptotic performance.
BBImprover does not incur accuracy loss from ignoring new data points mid-epoch as inBBScheduler
because it runsM at every time step. However, this also means that privacy loss will accumulate much faster
than in BBScheduler because more computations are being composed. To combat this and achieve overall
privacy loss ǫ, each run ofM will have increasingly strict (i.e., smaller) privacy parameter ǫt. The additional
noise needed to preserve privacy will overpower the improvements in accuracy until the database grows
sufficiently large, when the accuracy of BBImprover will surpass the comparable fixed accuracy guarantee
of BBScheduler. For any p > 0, the guarantees of BBImprover are stronger when t≫ n2. This suggests
that an analyst’s choice of algorithm should depend on her starting database size and expectations of data
growth.
4 Private Multiplicative Weights for Growing Databases
In this section, we show how to modify the private multiplicative weights (PMW) algorithm for adaptive
linear queries [HR10] to handle continuous data growth. The first black box process BBScheduler in the
previous section shows that any algorithm can be rerun with appropriate privacy parameters at appropriate
points of data growth with minimal loss of accuracy with respect to the intra-epoch data. However, in some
settings it may be undesirable to ignore new data for long periods of time, even if the overall accuracy loss
is small. Although BBImprover runs the black box algorithm at every step for eventual tighter accuracy
bounds, these bounds are inferior until the database grows substantially. We now show how to open the
black box and apply these scheduling techniques with a modification of PMW that considers all available
data when a query arrives, achieving tight bounds on accuracy as soon as analysis begins and continuing
through infinite data growth.
The static PMW algorithm answers an adaptive stream of queries while maintaining a public histogram
reflecting the current estimate of the database given all previously answered queries. Critical to the perfor-
mance of the algorithm is that it categorizes incoming queries as either easy or hard, suffering significant
privacy loss only for the hard queries. Hardness is determined with respect to the public histogram: upon
receipt of a query for which the histogram provides a significantly different answer than the true database,
PMW classifies this as a hard query, and it updates the histogram in a way that moves it closer to a correct
answer on that query. The number of hard queries is bounded using a potential argument. Potential is
defined as the relative entropy between the database and the public histogram. This quantity is initially
bounded, decreases by a substantial amount after every hard query, and never increases.
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If we run static PMW on a growing database, the previous potential argument fails because the relative
entropy between the database and the public histogram can increase as new data arrive. In the worst case,
PMW can learn the database with high accuracy (using many hard queries), and then adversarial data
growth can change the composition of the database dramatically, increasing the number of possible hard
queries well beyond the bound for the static case. Instead, we modify PMW so that the public histogram
updates not only in response to hard queries but also in response to new data arrivals. By treating the new
data as coming from a uniform distribution, these latter updates incur no additional privacy loss, and they
mitigate the relative entropy increase due to new data. In fact, this modification allows us to suffer only
constant loss in accuracy per query relative to the static setting, while maintaining this accuracy through
unbounded data growth and accumulating additional query budget during growth.
4.1 (ǫ, 0)-Differentially Private PMWG
Our formal algorithm for PMW for growing databases (PMWG) is given as Algorithm 3 below. We give an
overview here to motivate our main results. The algorithm takes as input a database stream X = {xt}t≥n
and an adaptively chosen query stream F = {{ft,j}ℓtj=1}t≥n. It also accepts privacy and accuracy parameters
ǫ, δ, α. In this section we restrict to the case where δ = 0; in Section 4.2, we allow δ > 0.
The algorithm maintains a fractional histogram y over X , where yt,j denotes the histogram after the jth
query at time t has been processed. This histogram is initialized to uniform, i.e., yin,0 = 1/N for all i ∈ [N ].
As with static PMW, when a query is deemed hard, our algorithm performs a multiplicative weights update
of y with learning rate α/6. As an extension of the static case, we also update the weights of y when a new
data entry arrives to reflect a data-independent prior belief that data arrive from a uniform distribution.
That is, for all t > n, i ∈ [N ],
yit,0 =
t− 1
t
yit−1,ℓt−1 +
1
t
1
N
.
It is important to note that a multiplicative weights update depends only on the noisy answer to a hard
query as in the static case, and the uniform update only depends on the knowledge that a new entry arrived,
so this histogram can be thought of as public.
As in static PMW, we determine hardness using a Numeric Sparse subroutine. We specify a hardness
threshold of T = 23α, and we additionally specify a function ξ that varies with time and determines how
much noise to add to the hardness quantities. Our most general result for (ǫ, 0)-privacy (Theorem 22 in
Appendix B.1) considers other noise functions, but for the results stated here, we let ξt =
α2ǫn1/2
c log(Nn) · t1/2 for
appropriate constant c. A query’s hardness is determined by the subroutines after adding Laplace noise with
parameter 4/ξt. We present and analyze the required growing database modifications to Numeric Sparse
and its subroutines Numeric Above Threshold and Above Threshold in Appendix C; these algorithms may
be of independent interest for future work in the design of private algorithms for growing databases.
We now present our main result for PMWG, Theorem 14. We sketch its proof here and give the full
proof in Appendix B.1. Whereas the accuracy results for static PMW are parametrized by the total allowed
queries k, our noise scaling means our algorithm can accommodate more and more queries as new data
continue to arrive. Our accuracy result is with respect to a query stream respecting a query budget that
increases at each time t by a quantity increasing exponentially with
√
t. This budget is parametrized by
time-independent κ ≥ 1, which is somewhat analogous to the total query budget k in static PMW. This
theorem tells us that PMWG can accommodate poly(κ) queries on the original database. Since κ degrades
accuracy logarithmically, this means we can accurately answer exponentially many queries before any new
data arrive. In particular, our accuracy bounds are tight with respect to the static setting, and we maintain
this accuracy through unbounded data growth, subject to a generous query budget specified by the theorem’s
bound on
∑t
τ=n ℓτ .
Theorem 14. The algorithm PMWG(X,F, ǫ, 0, α, n) is (ǫ, 0)-differentially private, and for any time-independent
κ ≥ 1 and β > 0 it is (α, β)-accurate for any query stream F such that ∑tτ=n ℓτ ≤ κ∑tτ=n exp( α3ǫ√nτC log(Nn) )
14
Algorithm 3 PMWG(X,F, ǫ, δ, α, n)
if δ = 0 then
Let ξt ← α2n1/2162 log(Nn)ǫt1/2 for t ≥ n
else
Let ξt ← αn1/248 log1/2(Nn) log1/2(1/δ)ǫt1/2 for t ≥ n
end if
Start NSG(X, ·, 2α/3, {ξt}t≥n) ⊲ Initialize subroutine
Let yin,0 ← 1/N for i ∈ [N ] ⊲ Public histogram
Let ht ← 0 for t ≥ n ⊲ Hard query counters
Let bt ← logNt + log(t−1)t + log tt−1 for t ≥ n+ 1 ⊲ Hard query bounds
for each incoming query ft,j do
if last query was at time t′ < t then
Let yit,0 ← t
′
t y
i
t′,ℓt′
+ t−t
′
t
1
N for i ∈ [N ] ⊲ Uniform update
end if
Let f ′t,2j−1 ← ft,j − ft,j(yt,j−1), f ′t,2j ← ft,j(yt,j−1)− ft,j
Receive a′t,2j−i, a
′
t,2j from NSG on f
′
t,2j−1, f
′
t,2j ⊲ Check hardness
if a′t,2j−1 =⊥ and a′t,2j =⊥ then
Let yt,j ← yt,j−1
Output at,j ← ft,j(yt,j) ⊲ Compute easy query answer
else
Let ht ← ht + 1
if
∑t
τ=n hτ >
36
α2
(
logN +
∑t
τ=n+1 bτ
)
then
return ⊥ ⊲ Hard query budget exceeded
end if
if a′t,2j−1 ∈ R then
Output at,j ← ft,j(yt,j−1) + a′t,2j−1
else
Output at,j ← ft,j(yt,j−1)− a′t,2j
end if ⊲ Compute hard query answer
if at,j < ft,j(yt,j−1) then
Let rt,j ← ft,j
else
Let rt,j ← 1− ft,j
end if
Let yˆit,j ← exp
(−α6 rit,j) yit,j−1 for i ∈ [N ]
Let yit,j ←
yˆit,j
∑
i′∈[N ] yˆ
i′
t,j
for i ∈ [N ] ⊲ MW update
end if
end for
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for all t ≥ n and sufficiently large constant C, as long as N ≥ 3, n ≥ 21 and
α ≥ C
(
log(Nn) log(κn/β)
nǫ
)1/3
.
Proof sketch. The proof hinges on showing that we do not have to answer too many hard queries, even as
the composition of the database changes with new data, potentially increasing the relative entropy between
the database and the public histogram. We first show that our new public histogram update rule bounds
this relative entropy increase (Lemma 15), and then show that the bound on the number of hard queries
does not suffer too much relative to the static setting (Corollary 16).
Lemma 15. Let x, y, x¯, y¯ ∈ ∆(X ) respectively be databases of size t, t, t+ 1, t+ 1, where x¯ is obtained by
adding one entry to x and y¯i = tt+1y
i + 1(t+1)N for i ∈ [N ]. Then,
RE (x¯||y¯)− RE (x||y) ≤ logN
t+ 1
+
log t
t+ 1
+ log(
t+ 1
t
).
The corollary below comes from a straightforward modification of the proof on the bound on hard queries
in static PMW using the result above.
Corollary 16. For a particular run of PMWG, if the Numeric Sparse subroutine returns α/3-accurate
answers for each query, then the total number of hard queries answered by any time t ≥ n is given by
t∑
τ=n
hτ ≤ 36
α2
(
logN +
t∑
τ=n+1
log(N)
τ
+
log(τ − 1)
τ
+ log(
τ
τ − 1)
)
.
With this corollary, we separately prove privacy and accuracy (Theorems 18 and 19) in terms of the noise
function ξ, which yield our desired result when instantiated with the ξ specified by Algorithm 3. As with
static PMW, the only privacy leaked is by the Numeric Sparse subroutine, which is differentially private
(Theorem 29). The privacy loss depends in the usual ways on the noise parameter, the query sensitivity,
and the number of hard queries, although in our setting both the noise parameter and query sensitivity are
changing over time.
After the proof Theorem 14 in Appendix B.1, Theorem 22 gives results for a generalization of PMWG
specified by Equation (B.5). This generalization leaves a free parameter in the noise function ξ used by the
subroutine, allowing one to trade off between accuracy and a query budget that increases more with time.
4.2 (ǫ, δ)-Differentially Private PMWG
We remark that we can tighten our accuracy bounds if we allow (ǫ, δ)-differential privacy in a manner
analogous to the δ > 0 relaxation for static PMW. Using CDP composition [BS16] to bound the privacy loss
at each time step in the algorithm, we get the following result. As with its δ = 0 counterpart, Theorem 17 is
also an instantiation of a more general result (Theorem 24) for a version of the algorithm with a free noise
parameter, proven in Appendix B.2.
Theorem 17. The algorithm PMWG(X,F, ǫ, δ, α, n) is (ǫ, δ) differentially private for any ǫ ∈ (0, 1], δ ∈
(0, e−1), and for any time-independent κ ≥ 1 and β ∈ (0, 2−15/2) it is (α, β)-accurate for any query stream
F such that
∑t
τ=n ℓτ ≤ κ
∑t
τ=n exp(
α2ǫ
√
nτ
C log1/2(Nn) log1/2(1/δ)
) for all t ≥ n as long as N ≥ 3, n ≥ 17 and
α ≥ C
(
log1/2(Nn) log(κn/β) log1/2(1/δ)
nǫ
)1/2
.
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A Analysis of Blackbox Scheduler
In this appendix we present the proofs that were omitted in Section 3.
A.1 Fixed Accuracy as Data Accumulate
Theorem 10. LetM be a (p, g)-black box for query class F . Then for any database stream X and stream
of linear queries F over F , BBScheduler(X,F,M, ǫ, δ, β, n, p, g) is (ǫ, δ)-differentially private for ǫ < 1 and
(α, β)-accurate for sufficiently large constant C and
α ≥


Cg
1
2p+1
(
log(1/β)
ǫn
) p
2p+1
if δ = 0
Cg
1
1.5p+1
(√
log(1/δ) log(1/β)
ǫn
) p
1.5p+1
if δ > 0
.
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Proof. We begin with the privacy guarantees of BBScheduler. When δ = 0, BBScheduler runs M in
each epoch i with privacy parameter ǫi =
γ2(i+1)
(1+γ)i+2 ǫ. Then by Basic Composition (Theorem 3), BBSched-
uler is (
∑∞
i=0 ǫi, 0)-differentially private, where
∞∑
i=0
ǫi =
γ2
1 + γ
ǫ
∞∑
i=0
i+ 1
(1 + γ)i+1
= ǫ.
The sum
∑∞
i=0
i+1
(1+γ)i+1 converges to
1+γ
γ2 , so BBScheduler is (ǫ, 0)-differentially private.
When δ > 0, BBScheduler runs M with privacy parameter ǫi = γ
1.5(i+1)
(1+γ)i+1.5
ǫ
3
√
log(1/δ)
in each epoch i.
By Theorem 4, the total privacy loss is at most 12
∑∞
i=0 ǫ
2
i +
√
2 (
∑∞
i=0 ǫ
2
i ) log(1/δ). Note that
∞∑
i=0
ǫ2i =
ǫ2
9 log(1/δ)
γ3
1 + γ
∞∑
i=0
(i + 1)2
(1 + γ)2(i+1)
=
ǫ2
9 log(1/δ)
γ3
1 + γ
(1 + γ)2(γ2 + 2γ + 2)
γ3(γ + 2)3
≤ 2ǫ
2
9 log(1/δ)
where we used the fact that γ ∈ (0, 1). Then the total privacy loss is at most
ǫ2
9 log(1/δ)
+
2ǫ
3
√
log(1/δ)
√
log(1/δ) ≤ ǫ
since ǫ < 1.
To prove the accuracy of BBScheduler we require the following lemma, which bounds the additive
error introduced by answering queries that arrive mid-epoch using the slightly outdated database from the
end of the previous epoch.
Lemma 11. For any linear query f and databases xt and xτ from a database streamX , where τ ∈ [t, (1+γ)t]
for some γ ∈ (0, 1),
|xτ (f)− xt(f)| ≤ γ
1 + γ
.
Proof. The linear query xt(f) can be written in the following form: xt(f) =
1
t
∑N
i=1 tx
i
tf
i. Then since
xτ (f)− xt(f) = 1τ
∑N
i=1 τx
i
τ f
i − 1t
∑N
i=1 tx
i
tf
i, we have,
xτ (f)− xt(f) ≤ (τ − t) + tx
i
t
τ
− tx
i
t
t
≤ (τ − t) + tx
i
t
τ
− tx
i
t
τ
= 1− t
τ
,
xτ (f)− xt(f) ≥ tx
i
t
τ
− tx
i
t
t
≥ t
(
1
τ
− 1
t
)
=
t
τ
− 1.
The last inequality follows because 1τ − 1t ≤ 0 and txit ≤ t. Thus, |xτ (f)−xt(f)| ≤ 1− tτ . Since τ ∈ [t, (1+γ)t],
then,
1− t
τ
≤ 1− t
(1 + γ)t
= 1− 1
1 + γ
=
γ
1 + γ
.
We now continue to prove the accuracy of BBScheduler. Let ti = (1 + γ)
in. Recall that epoch i is
defined as the time interval where t ∈ {ti, ti + 1, ..., ti+1 − 1}. Let Fi denote the set of all queries received
during epoch i. All queries f ∈ Fi will be answered using yi, which is computed on database xti .
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We want to show that yi(f) is close to xt(f) for all f ∈ Fi. Since yi is the output of M(xti , ǫi, αi, βi),
we know that for f ∈ Fi,
|yi(f)− xti(f)| ≤ αi.
By the triangle inequality and Lemma 11, for any f ∈ Fi,
|yi(f)− xt(f)| ≤ |yi(f)− xti(f)|+ |xti(f)− xt(f)|
= αi +
γ
1 + γ
. (A.1)
When δ = 0, we have
αi = g
(
log 1βi
ǫini
)p
= g

 (i + 1) log 1+ββ
γ2(i+1)
(1+γ)i+2 ǫ(1 + γ)
in


p
= g
(
(1 + γ)2
γ2ǫn
log
1 + β
β
)p
Let Z =
log 1+ββ
ǫn . Note that since γ < 1, we have (1 + γ) ∈ (1, 2). Then (A.1) becomes
(A.1) ≤ αi + γ ≤ gZp
(
1
2
γ
)−2p
+ γ.
Since we set γ = g
1
2p+1Z
p
2p+1 , we have:
gZp
(
1
2
γ
)−2p
+ γ = gZp
(
1
2
g
1
2p+1Z
p
2p+1
)−2p
+ g
1
2p+1Z
p
2p+1
= C1g
1− 2p2p+1Zp−
p2
2p+1 + g
1
2p+1Z
p
2p+1
= C2g
1
2p+1Z
p
2p+1
where C1 and C2 are positive absolute constants.
When δ > 0, BBScheduler uses a different setting of γ and ǫi. Let Z =
3
√
log(1/δ) log 1+ββ
ǫn . In this case,
we have
αi = g
(
log 1βi
ǫini
)p
= g

 (i + 1) log 1+ββγ1.5(i+1)
(1+γ)i+1.5
ǫ
3
√
log(1/δ)
(1 + γ)in


p
= gZp
(
1 + γ
γ
)1.5p
≤ gZp
(
1
2
γ
)1.5p
Since we set γ = g
1
1.5p+1Z
p
1.5p+1 , we have:
(A.1) ≤ gZp
(
1
2
g
1
1.5p+1Z
p
1.5p+1
)−1.5p
+ g
1
1.5p+1Z
p
1.5p+1
≤ C1g1−
1.5p
1.5p+1Zp−
1.5p2
1.5p+1 + g
1
1.5p+1Z
p
1.5p+1
≤ C2g
1
1.5p+1Z
p
1.5p+1
where C1 and C2 are positive absolute constants.
The final accuracy bound for any δ ≥ 0 follows by substitution and by noting that log 1+ββ = O(log 1β )
since β ∈ (0, 1). Each of the αi bounds holds with probability 1 − βi, so by a union bound, all will hold
simultaneously with probability 1−∑∞i=0 βi, where,
∞∑
i=0
βi =
β
2n2i
≤
∞∑
t=n
β
2t2
≤ π
2
12
β ≤ β.
Then with probability at least 1 − β, all queries are answered with accuracy Cg 12p+1Z p2p+1 for δ = 0 and
Cg
1
1.5p+1Z
p
1.5p+1 for δ > 0 for some positive absolute constant C.
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A.2 Improving Accuracy as Data Accumulate
Theorem 13. Let c > 0 and let M be a (p, p′, p′′, g)-black box for query class F . Then for any database
stream X and stream of linear queries F over F , BBImprover(X,F,M, ǫ, δ, β, n, p, p′, p′′, g, c) is (ǫ, δ)-
differentially private for ǫ < 1 and ({αt}t≥n, β)-accurate for sufficiently large constant C and
αt = Cg log
p′(1/β)
(√
log(1/δ)√
cǫt
1
2−2c
)p
.
Proof. We start with the privacy guarantee. BBImprover runsM at each time t with privacy parameters
ǫt =
ǫ
t
1
2
+c
. By Theorem 4, the total privacy loss is at most 12
∑∞
t=n ǫ
2
t +
√
2 (
∑∞
t=n ǫ
2
t ) log(1/δ).
Note:
∞∑
t=n
ǫ2t =
cǫ2
9 log(1/δ)
∞∑
t=n
1
t1+2c
≤ cǫ
2
9 log(1/δ)
1
cn2c
≤ ǫ
2
9 log(1/δ)
.
since n ≥ 1 and c > 0. Then the privacy loss is at most:
1
18 log(1/δ)
ǫ2 +
2ǫ
3
√
log(1/δ)
√
log(1/δ) ≤ ǫ (A.2)
since ǫ < 1.
We next prove the accuracy of BBImprover. For each time t,M(xt, ǫt, αt, βt) is
(
g
(
1
ǫtt
)p
logp
′′
t logp
′
1
βt
, βt
)
-
accurate. We simply plug in ǫt and βt to get our accuracy bound at time t:
αt = g
(
1
ǫtt
)p
logp
′′
t logp
′ 1
βt
= g
(
3
√
log(1/δ)t
1
2+c√
cǫt
)p
logp
′′
t logp
′ 2t2
β
≤ C1g
(√
log(1/δ)√
cǫt
1
2−c
)p
logp
′′+p′ t logp
′ 1
β
≤ C2g
(√
log(1/δ)√
cǫt
1
2−2c
)p
logp
′ 1
β
,
for positive constants C1 and C2. The last line holds since log
p′′+p′ t = o(tc) for any positive constants c, p′,
and p′′.
The accuracy of M(xt, ǫt, βt) at time t holds with probability 1 − βt. By a union bound, all accuracy
guarantees will be satisfied with probability 1−∑∞t=n βt, where,
∞∑
t=n
βt =
∞∑
t=n
β
2t2
≤ π
2
12
β ≤ β.
B Analysis of PMW for Growing Databases
We first present the modification of PMW for growing databases described in Section 4 and presented
formally in Algorithm 3. We separately prove privacy and accuracy in terms of the internal noise function ξ,
which depends on the parameters of the algorithm. We then instantiate these theorems with our particular
choice of ξ to prove Theorem 14 from the body, which gives our accuracy bound for the (ǫ, 0)-differentially
private version of the algorithm. In Equation (B.5) we describe how to generalize our algorithm by adding
a parameter for the noise function, which allows us to trade accuracy for a larger query budget. Finally, we
use CDP to give our (ǫ, δ)-results, yielding Theorem 17.
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B.1 (ǫ, 0)-Differentially Private PMWG
(ǫ, 0)-privacy of PMWG follows from our analysis of the NSG subroutine (Appendix C.3) as well as Lemma 15
bounding the entropy increase due to new data and Corollary 16 bounding the number of hard queries received
by any given time. We first prove this lemma and then use it with its corollary to prove privacy of PMWG
in Theorem 18.
Lemma 15. Let x, y, x¯, y¯ ∈ ∆(X ) respectively be databases of size t, t, t+ 1, t+ 1, where x¯ is obtained by
adding one entry to x and y¯i = tt+1y
i + 1(t+1)N for i ∈ [N ]. Then,
RE (x¯||y¯)− RE (x||y) ≤ logN
t+ 1
+
log t
t+ 1
+ log(
t+ 1
t
).
Proof. We partition indices i ∈ [N ] into two sets L,H , where i ∈ L whenever yi ≤ 1tN . For each S ⊆ [N ],
use xS to denote
∑
i∈S x
i. Then, by y¯i ≥ 1(t+1)N for all i,∑
i∈L
(
x¯i log(1/y¯i)− xi log(1/yi)) ≤∑
i∈L
(
x¯i log(N(t+ 1))− xi log(1/yi))
≤
∑
i∈L
(
x¯i log(N(t+ 1))− xi log(tN))
=
∑
i∈L
(
x¯i log(Nt) + x¯i log(
t+ 1
t
)− xi log(tN)
)
=
∑
i∈L
(x¯i − xi) log(Nt) + x¯L log( t+ 1
t
)
≤
∑
i∈L
max{(x¯i − xi), 0} log(Nt) + x¯L log( t+ 1
t
)
The last inequality is by ignoring the term i ∈ L with x¯i < xi. Next, we use y¯i ≥ tt+1yi to get
∑
i∈H
(
x¯i log(1/y¯i)− xi log(1/yi)) ≤∑
i∈H
(
x¯i log(
t+ 1
t
(1/yi))− xi log(1/yi)
)
=
∑
i∈H
(
x¯i log(1/yi)− xi log(1/yi)
)
+ x¯i log(
t+ 1
t
))
=
∑
i∈H
[
(x¯i − xi) log(1/yi)]+ x¯H log( t+ 1
t
)
≤
∑
i∈H
max{(x¯i − xi), 0} log(1/yi) + x¯H log( t+ 1
t
)
≤
∑
i∈H
max{(x¯i − xi), 0} log(Nt) + x¯H log( t+ 1
t
)
The second inequality is by ignoring the term i ∈ H with x¯i < xi. Combining two bounds on L,H gives∑
i∈X
(
x¯i log(1/y¯i)− xi log(1/yi)
) ≤∑
i∈X
max{(x¯i − xi), 0} log(Nt) + log( t+ 1
t
)
Since there is at most one index i ∈ [N ] such that x¯i − xi ≥ 0 (the index of newly added data entry), and
for that term we have x¯i − xi = 1t+1 + tt+1xi − xi ≤ 1t+1 , we have∑
i∈X
(
x¯i log(1/y¯i)− xi log(1/yi)
) ≤ 1
t+ 1
log(Nt) + log(
t+ 1
t
)
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The following corollary is an immediate extension of the analysis for static PMW using the above lemma:
Corollary 16. For a particular run of PMWG, if the Numeric Sparse subroutine returns α/3-accurate
answers for each query, then the total number of hard queries answered by any time t ≥ n is given by
t∑
τ=n
hτ ≤ 36
α2
(
logN +
t∑
τ=n+1
log(N)
τ
+
log(τ − 1)
τ
+ log(
τ
τ − 1)
)
.
Theorem 18 (PMWG Privacy). PMWG(X,F, ǫ, 0, α, n) is (ǫ, 0)-DP for ξ as defined by the algorithm and
ǫ =
(
1 +
81
2α2
logN
)
ξn∆n +
81
2α2
∞∑
t=n+1
(
log(N)
t
+
log(t− 1)
t
+ log(
t
t− 1)
)
ξt∆t (B.1)
Proof. The uniform and MW updates to the public histogram do not use any information about X , and
therefore these updates do not leak any privacy. The only privacy leaked is by NSG, which by Theorem 29
is ǫ-DP for
ǫ = ξn∆n +
9
8
∞∑
t=n
htξt∆t
For convenience, let bn = log N . Because the algorithm enforces the hard query bound from Corollary 16,
and because ξt∆t is non-increasing, we may upper bound
∑∞
t=n htξt∆t by setting ht =
36
α2 bt. Hence,
ǫ ≤
(
1 +
81
2α2
logN
)
ξn∆n +
81
2α2
∞∑
t=n+1
(
log(N)
t
+
log(t− 1)
t
+ log(
t
t− 1)
)
ξt∆t
Next we show the accuracy of PMWG.
Theorem 19 (PMWG Accurary). Let k : {n, n + 1, . . .} → R. On query stream F such that ∑tτ=n ℓτ ≤∑t
τ=n kτ , PMWG(X,F, ǫ, 0, α, n) outputs answers such that |ft,j(Dt)− at,j | ≤ α for every query ft,j except
with probability
β ≤ exp(−αξn
24
) + 3
∑
t≥n
kt exp(−αξt
24
) (B.2)
Proof. By the exact same proof in [DR14]: PMWG’s α-accuracy follows if NSG returns answers that are
α/3-accurate. Hence, we can take the β from the NSG accuracy analysis in Theorem 31.
These privacy and accuracy results are in terms of noise scaling function ξ. The ξ enforced by the
algorithm is chosen to get good privacy and accuracy bounds simultaneously (Theorem 14). Specifically, we
need to ensure that the ǫ and β bounds in (B.1) and (B.2) converge. The dominating term in the hard query
bound bt in the algorithm is log(t− 1)/t, so to guarantee convergence of our ǫ bound, we need
∑
t≥n+1
log(t− 1)ξt∆t
t
=
∑
t≥n+1
log(t− 1)ξt
t2
≤
∫ ∞
t=n
log(t− 1)ξt
t2
dt,
so we may pick ξ = O(t1−c) for any c > 0. To guarantee convergence of our β bound and allow α to degrade
logarithmically in the number of queries ℓt, we want
∑
t≥n kt exp(−αξt24 ) to converge exponentially quickly
in α. For example, we may pick query budget kt = O(exp(
αξt
48 )) and ξt = Ω(t
c) for any c > 0. To get
these conditions simultaneously, Algorithm 3 picks ξt = ct
1/2 for some time-independent quantity c > 0, and
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we guarantee accuracy for query streams respective query budget kt = κ exp(
αct1/2
48 ) for some constant c, κ.
Other reasonable choices of ξt, kt are possible; we discuss these after proving our main result for Algorithm 3.
We prove the result below without suppressing constants in the query budget and the α bound, i.e.,
we prove that
∑t
τ=n ℓτ ≤ κ
∑t
τ=n exp(
α3ǫ
√
nτ
8262 log(Nn) ) and α ≥ (8262 log(Nn) log(192κn/β)nǫ )1/3 suffice for accuracy.
Note that with this choice of α, the query budget grows exponentially with
√
t since κ
∑t
τ=n exp
(
α3ǫ
√
nτ
8262 log(Nn)
)
≥
κ
∑t
τ=n
(
192κn
β
) 17
16
√
τ
n
.
Theorem 14. The algorithm PMWG(X,F, ǫ, 0, α, n) is (ǫ, 0)-differentially private, and for any time-independent
κ ≥ 1 and β > 0 it is (α, β)-accurate for any query stream F such that ∑tτ=n ℓτ ≤ κ∑tτ=n exp( α3ǫ√nτC log(Nn) )
for all t ≥ n and sufficiently large constant C, as long as N ≥ 3, n ≥ 21 and
α ≥ C
(
log(Nn) log(κn/β)
nǫ
)1/3
.
Proof. Our main result is an instantiation of the more general results in Theorems 18 and 19. In what
follows, let ξt = ct
1/2 for some time-independent c > 0. Applying Theorem 18, the privacy loss of PMWG is
ǫ′ =
(
1 +
81
2α2
logN
)
cn−1/2 +
81
2α2
∞∑
t=n+1
(
log(N)
t
+
log(t− 1)
t
+ log(
t
t− 1)
)
ct−1/2
≤
(
81
α2
logN
)
cn−1/2 +
81c
2α2
∫ ∞
t=n
(
log(N)
t3/2
+
log(t)
t3/2
+
1
(t− 1)3/2
)
dt
=
81c logN
α2n1/2
+
81c
2α2
[
−2 logN
t1/2
− 4 + 2 log t
t1/2
− 2
(t− 1)1/2
]∞
t=n
=
81c
α2
(
2 logN
n1/2
+
2 + logn
n1/2
+
1
(n− 1)1/2
)
≤ 81c
α2
· 2(logN + logn)
n1/2
,
using log(t/(t− 1))t−1/2 = log(1+ 1t−1 )t−1/2 ≤ 1t−1 (t− 1)−1/2 for the first inequality and n ≥ 21 for the last
inequality. Finally, setting c = α
2n1/2
162 log(Nn)ǫ gives ǫ
′ = ǫ.
Applying Theorem 19, PMWG is (α, β′) -accurate for
β′ = exp(−cαn
1/2
24
) + 3κ
∑
t≥n
exp(
cαt1/2
48
) exp(−cαt
1/2
24
)
≤ exp(−cαn
1/2
24
) + 3κ
∫ ∞
t=n−1
exp(−cαt
1/2
48
)dt
= exp(−cαn
1/2
24
) + 3κ
[
−96
(
αc
√
t+ 48
)
exp(−αc
√
t
48 )
α2c2
]∞
t=n−1
= exp(−cαn
1/2
24
) + 288κ
(
αc
√
n− 1 + 48)
α2c2
exp(−αc
√
n− 1
48
)
To get β′ ≤ β, we can require exp(− cαn1/224 ) ≤ β/2 and 288κ
(
αc
√
n− 1 + 48)
α2c2
exp(−αc
√
n−1
48 ) ≤ β/2. The
first is equivalent to
cαn1/2
24
≥ log(2/β) ⇐⇒ cα ≥ 24 log(2/β)
n1/2
⇐⇒ α ≥
(
3888 log(Nn) log(2/β)
nǫ
)1/3
(B.3)
We assume that α satisfies (B.3) before proceeding. Secondly, (B.3) gives cα ≥ 24 log(2/β)
n1/2
, which implies
(
αc
√
n− 1 + 48)
α2c2
≤ n
1/2
√
n− 1
24 log(2/β)
+
n
12 log2(2/β)
≤ n(log(2/β) + 2)
24 log2(2/β)
≤ n(2 + log 2)
24 log2(2)
<
n
3
Hence, it’s enough to require 96κn exp(−αc
√
n−1
48 ) ≤ β/2. This is equivalent to
αc
√
n− 1
48
≥ log(192κn/β)
For n ≥ 9,
√
n−1
48 ≥ n
1/2
51 , so we only need
αc
51
≥ log(192κn/β)
n1/2
⇐⇒ α ≥
(
8262 log(Nn) log(192κn/β)
nǫ
)1/3
(B.4)
(B.4) is a stronger bound than (B.3) for κ ≥ 1.
B.1.1 (ǫ, 0)-Differential Privacy for PMWG with Different Noise Functions
We can still achieve good privacy and accuracy for other choices of ξ and query budget. In this section we
consider a generalization of PMWG that include an additional parameter p. The only difference between
this generalization and Algorithm 3 is that the modified version defines the noise function as
ξt =


α2(1−p)2n1−p
126 log(Nn) ǫt
p if δ = 0
α(1−p)n1−p
24 log1/2(Nn) log1/2(1/δ)
ǫtp if δ > 0
(B.5)
Theorem 22 shows that this choice yields an accuracy bound of
α ≥
(
6426 log(Nn) log(144κn/β)
(1 − p)2nǫ
)1/3
.
This is comparable to accuracy of static PMW, αstatic = Θ
(
logN log(k/β)
nǫ
)1/3
, and it yields query budget
κ
t∑
τ=n
exp
(
α3(1− p)2ǫn1−pτp
6048 log(Nn)
)
≥ κ
t∑
τ=n
(
144κn
β
) 17
16 (
τ
n)
p
. (B.6)
These bounds tell us that as p approaches 1, the query budget approaches exponential in t, but accuracy
suffers proportionally to (1 − p)−2/3. Therefore, we suffer only a constant loss in accuracy as long as n is
bounded polynomially in N and k/β. Note that, however, our query budget in the growing setting allows a
generous additional number of queries to be asked upon each arrival of new data entry.
Before proving our general result (Theorem 22), we first present two useful lemmas. The first bounds
privacy loss for ξ of our more general form.
Lemma 20. Assuming n ≥ 5, N ≥ 3, the privacy loss associated with Algorithm 3 using ξt such that
ξt∆t = ct
−q for some constant c independent of t and 1 ≥ q > 0 is ǫ′ ≤ 126c log(Nn)α2q2nq .
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Proof. Applying the hard query bound from Corollary 16, privacy loss is bounded as follows:
ǫ′ =
(
1 +
81
2α2
logN
)
ξn∆n +
81
2α2
∞∑
t=n+1
(
log(N)
t
+
log(t− 1)
t
+ log(
t
t− 1)
)
ξt∆t
=
(
1 +
81
2α2
logN
)
cn−q +
81
2α2
∞∑
t=n+1
(
log(N)
t
+
log(t− 1)
t
+ log(
t
t− 1)
)
ct−q
≤
(
81
α2
logN
)
cn−q +
81c
2α2
∫ ∞
t=n
(
t−q−1 log(N) + t−q−1 log(t) + (t− 1)−q−1) dt
=
81c logN
α2
n−q +
81c
2α2
[
− log(N)t
−q + log(t)t−q + (t− 1)−q
q
− t
−q
q2
]∞
t=n
≤ 81c logN
α2
n−q +
81c
2α2
(
log(N)n−q + log(n)n−q + 2n−q
q
+
n−q
q2
)
≤ 81c logN
α2
n−q +
81c
2α2
(
log(N) + log(n) + 3
q2
)
n−q
≤ 81cn
−q
2α2
(
2 logN +
log(N) + log(n) + 3
q2
)
≤ 81cn
−q
2α2
(
3 log(Nn)
q2
)
≤ 126c log(Nn)
α2q2nq
where we use the fact that (n− 1)−q ≤ 2n−q and logN ≤ logNq2 for n ≥ 2, 0 ≤ q ≤ 1, and that 3 ≤ 2 logn for
n ≥ 5.
We also know that for ξt = Ω(t
p) for some p > 0,
∫∞
t=n−1 exp(− cαξt48 )dt = Pp,cα(n − 1) exp(−
cαξn−1
48 ) for
some polynomial Pp,cα(n) dependent on p, cα. Stating the exact bound for this integral, however, involves
approximating an upper incomplete gamma function. In the following lemma, which will be used to bound
the probability of failure for our algorithm with these modified parameters, we therefore require p ≥ 1/4,
noting that we could better optimize constants with smaller p.
Lemma 21. Let 1 ≥ p ≥ 1/4, n ≥ 17 and c, α be constants independent of t such that cαnp ≥ 24 log(2/β)
and β < 2−15/2. Then
∫ ∞
t=n−1
exp
(
−cαt
p
48
)
dt ≤ 6ne
− cαnp51
p
Proof. We have
∫ ∞
t=n−1
exp(−cαt
p
48
)dt =
Γ
(
1
p ,
cα
48 (n− 1)p
)
p( cα48 )
1
p
where Γ(s, x) =
∫∞
x
ts−1e−tdt is an upper incomplete gamma function. We now use the bound in [Jam16]8
that for any a > 1, ex > 2a, we have Γ (a, x) ≤ 2axa−1e−x. With n ≥ 17, cα48 (n − 1)p ≥ cαn
p
51 ≥ 8 log(2/β)17 .
Choosing β < 2−15/2 gives exp(8 log(2/β)17 ) ≥ 24 ≥ 21/p, so we can apply the bound
Γ
(
1
p
,
cα
48
(n− 1)p
)
≤ Γ
(
1
p
,
cαnp
51
)
≤ 21/p
(
cαnp
51
) 1
p−1
e−
cαnp
51
8Proposition 10 from the extended version http://www.maths.lancs.ac.uk/jameson/gammainc.pdf
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Therefore,
Γ
(
1
p ,
cα
48 (n− 1)p
)
p( cα48 )
1
p
≤ 51(32/17)
1/pne−
cαnp
51
pcαnp
≤ 17(32/17)
1/pne−
cαnp
51
8p log(2/β)
≤ 6ne
− cαnp51
p
where we use p ≥ 1/4 and β < 2−15/2 to get the last inequality.
Finally, we give our overall privacy and accuracy guarantees of our modified algorithm.
Theorem 22 (Generalized-Noise PMWG ǫ-DP Result). Let p ∈ [1/4, 1). The algorithm PMWG(X,F, ǫ, 0, α, n, p)
that generalizes Algorithm 3 as in B.5 is (ǫ, 0)-differentially private, and for any time-independent κ ≥ 1 and
β ∈ (0, 2−15/2) it is (α, β)-accurate for any query stream F such that∑tτ=n ℓτ ≤ κ∑tτ=n exp(α3(1−p)2ǫn1−pτp6048 log(Nn) )
for all t ≥ n as long as N ≥ 3, n ≥ 17 and
α ≥
(
6426 log(Nn) log(144κn/β)
(1− p)2nǫ
)1/3
(B.7)
Proof. Applying Theorem 18 and Lemma 20, the privacy loss of PMWG is
ǫ′ ≤ 126c log(Nn)
α2q2nq
where q = 1− p > 0. Setting c = α2(1−p)2n1−p126 log(Nn) ǫ gives ǫ′ = ǫ.
Applying Theorem 19, PMWG is (α, β′) -accurate for
β′ ≤ exp(−cαn
p
24
) + 3κ
∫ ∞
t=n−1
exp(−cαt
p
48
)dt
Again, we require the first term to be at most β/2:
cαnp
24
≥ log(2/β) ⇐⇒ (1− p)
2α3n
126 log(Nn)
ǫ ≥ 24 log(2/β) ⇐⇒ α ≥
(
3024 log(Nn) log(2/β)
(1− p)2nǫ
)1/3
(B.8)
We assume that α satisfies this requirement before proceeding. Now we apply Lemma 21:
∫ ∞
t=n−1
exp(−cαt
p
48
)dt ≤ 6ne
− cαnp51
p
≤ 24ne− cαn
p
51
So it’s enough to require 3κ · 24ne− cαnp51 ≤ β/2. This is equivalent to
cαnp
51
≥ log
(
144κn
β
)
⇐⇒ (1− p)
2α3n
126 log(Nn)
ǫ ≥ 51 log
(
144κn
β
)
(B.9)
⇐⇒ α ≥
(
6426 log(Nn) log(144κn/β)
(1− p)2nǫ
)1/3
(B.10)
Clearly the second requirement is stronger than the first for κ ≥ 1.
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B.2 (ǫ, δ)-Differentially Private PMWG
With Theorem 4, the total privacy loss from composition of differentially private subroutines is the sum of
squared privacy losses, rather than the sum. For our algorithm with δ > 0, it is straight forward to compute
the sum of squares of all points of privacy loss as
ǫ′ :=
(
1 +
585
16α2
logN
)
(ξn∆n)
2 +
585
16α2
∞∑
t=n+1
(
log(N)
t
+
log(t− 1)
t
+ log(
t
t− 1)
)
(ξt∆t)
2 (B.11)
We now state how to upper bound this sum, which is in a similar form to Lemma 20.
Lemma 23. Let ξt∆t = ct
−q for some constant c independent of t and 1 ≥ q > 0. Then, for n ≥ 3, N ≥ 3,
and ǫ′ as in Equation B.11, we have
√
ǫ′ ≤ 12cn−q log1/2(Nn)αq .
Proof. By a similar calculation as in Lemma 20 but with c2n−2q in place of cn−q,
ǫ′ ≤ 585c
2 logN
8α2
n−2q +
585c2
16α2
(
log(N)n−2q + log(n)n−2q + 2n−2q
2q
+
n−2q
4q2
)
≤ 585
2 logN
8α2
n−2q +
585c2
16α2
(
2 log(N) + 2 log(n) + 5
4q2
)
n−2q
≤ c
2n−2q
α2
(
585
8
· logN
q2
+
585
64
· 2 log(N) + 10 log(n)
q2
)
=
c2n−2q
α2
(
2925 log(Nn)
32q2
)
where we use the bounds 5 ≤ 8 log(n) and logN ≤ logNq2 . The result now follows.
With the bound by Lemma 23 and Theorem 4, we achieve an (ǫ, δ)-differentially private version of PMWG.
Note that Theorem 17 instantiates this result with p = 1/2.
Theorem 24 (Generalized-Noise PMWG (ǫ, δ)-DP Result). Let p ∈ [1/4, 1), δ ∈ (0, e−1). The algo-
rithm PMWG(X,F, ǫ, δ, α, n, p) is (ǫ, δ)-differentially private, and for any time-independent κ ≥ 1 and β ∈
(0, 2−15/2) it is (α, β)-accurate for any query stream F such that
∑t
τ=n ℓτ ≤ κ
∑t
τ=n exp(
α2(1−p)ǫn1−pτp
1152 log1/2(Nn) log1/2(1/δ)
)
for all t ≥ n as long as N ≥ 3, n ≥ 17 and
α ≥
(
1224 log1/2(Nn) log(144κn/β) log1/2(1/δ)
(1 − p)nǫ
)1/2
(B.12)
Proof. Applying Lemma 23 and Theorem 4, PMWG is (ǫ, δ)-DP for
ǫ′ ≤ 24cn
−q log1/2(Nn) log1/2(1/δ)
αq
where q = 1 − p > 0. Setting c = α(1−p)n1−p
24 log1/2(Nn) log1/2(1/δ)
ǫ gives ǫ′ = ǫ. The rest of the proof now follows the
proof of Theorem 22, except that now αcnp = α
2(1−p)nǫ
24 log1/2(Nn) log1/2(1/δ)
instead of αcnp = α
3(1−p)2nǫ
126 log(Nn) .
Finally, we can make an observation analogous to that made at the beginning of Subsection B.1.1 for
(ǫ, δ)-differential privacy. Note that for α as in Theorem 24, we have query budget
κ
t∑
τ=n
exp(
α2(1− p)ǫn1−pτp
1152 log1/2(Nn) log1/2(1/δ)
) ≥ κ
t∑
τ=n
(
144κn
β
) 17
16 (
τ
n)
p
(B.13)
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As we let p approach 1, we increase the query budget (lower bounded by (B.6) as well) and suffer accuracy
loss proportional to (1 − p)−1/2 compared to Θ
(
log1/2 N log(k/β) log(1/δ)
ǫn
)1/2
accuracy of static (ǫ, δ)-private
PMW, as long as n is bounded polynomially in N and k/β.
C Sparse Vector Algorithms for Growing Databases
In this section, we consider three primitive algorithms that apply the sparse vector technique in the static
setting: above threshold, numeric above threshold, and numeric sparse. We modify these algorithms for the
dynamic setting of growing databases, and we call our modifications ATG, NATG, and NSG, respectively.
The main difference in analyzing privacy and accuracy for dynamic algorithms is that the results now depend
on a changing database size. In this section, the database has starting size t0 and it grows by one entry each
time step, starting at time t0.
C.1 Above Threshold for Growing Databases
We first consider the simplest of these algorithms: ATG. This algorithm simply compares a noisy answer to
a query from stream F = {{ft,i}ℓti=1}t≥t0 applied to the current database Dt to a noisy threshold Tˆt ≈ T
and aborts the first time a noisy answer exceeds the noisy threshold. The noise added is determined by a
noise function ξ : {t0, t0 + 1, . . .} → R.
Algorithm 4 ATG(D,F, T, ξ)
for each incoming query ft,i do
if i = 1 then
Let Tˆt ← T + Lap( 2ξt ) ⊲ Noisy threshold for queries at time t
end if
Let νt,i ← Lap( 4ξt ) ⊲ Noise for query ft,i
if ft,i(Dt) + νt,i ≥ Tˆt then
Output at,i ← ⊤ and halt ⊲ Abort on first query above threshold
else
Output at,i ← ⊥
end if
end for
Theorem 25 (Privacy of ATG). Let ξ,∆ : {t0, t0+1, . . .} → R+ be such that both ∆, ξ ·∆ are non-increasing
and ξ is non-decreasing. Let F = {{ft,i}ℓti=1}t≥t0 be a stream of queries with sensitivity ∆ft,i ≤ ∆t for all
(t, i). Then for any a in the range of ATG and any neighboring database streams D,D′ of starting size t0,
Pr [ATG(D,F, T, ξ) = a] ≤ exp(ξt0∆t0) Pr [ATG(D′, F, T, ξ) = a]
Proof. We follow the proof as in [DR14], but modify it slightly. Let A,A′ represent the random variables of
output of ATG running on D,D′, respectively. Suppose ATG halts at the last query ft′,i′ . Let a denote this
output, i.e. at,i = ⊥ for all (t, i) < (t′, i′) and at′,i′ = ⊤. Define
H(D) = max
(t,i)<(t′,i′)
ξt · (ft,i(Dt) + νt,i − T )
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Fix νt,i for all (t, i) < (t
′, i′) , so that H(D) is a deterministic quantity. Then,
Pr
η,νt′,i′
[A = a] = Pr
η,νt′,i′
[
ft,i(Dt) + νt,i < Tˆt, ∀(t, i) < (t′, i′) and ft′,i′(Dt′) + νt′,i′ ≥ Tˆt′
]
= Pr
η,νt′,i′
[H(D) < η and ξt′ · (ft′,i′(Dt′) + νt′,i′ − T ) ≥ η]
= Pr
η,νt′,i′
[η ∈ (H(D), ξt′ · (ft′,i′(Dt′) + νt′,i′ − T )]
=
∫ ∞
−∞
∫ ∞
−∞
Pr
νt′,i′
[νt′,i′ = v]
· Pr
η
[η = η0]1[η0 ∈ (H(D), ξt′ · (ft′,i′(Dt′) + v − T )] dv dη0
:= ∗
Apply a change of variables as follows:
vˆ = v +
H(D)−H(D′)
ξt′
+ ft′,i′(Dt′)− ft′,i′(D′t′)
ηˆ0 = η0 +H(D)−H(D′)
We have |H(D) − H(D′)| ≤ maxt≥t0 ξt∆t = ξt0∆t0 (by ξt∆t being non-increasing), and |ft′,i′(Dt′) −
ft′,i′(D
′
t′)| ≤ ∆t′ . Therefore,
|vˆ − v| ≤ ξt0∆t0
ξt′
+∆t′ , |ηˆ0 − η0| ≤ ξt0∆t0
Apply this change of variable to get
∗ =
∫ ∞
−∞
∫ ∞
−∞
Pr
νt′,i′
[νt′,i′ = vˆ] Pr
η
[η = ηˆ0]1[η0 +H(D)−H(D′) ∈
(H(D), ξt′ · (ft′,i′(Dt′) + vˆ − T )] dv dη0
=
∫ ∞
−∞
∫ ∞
−∞
Pr
νt′,i′
[νt′,i′ = vˆ] Pr
η
[η = ηˆ0]1[η0 ∈
(H(D′), ξt′ · (ft′,i′(Dt′) + vˆ − T ) +H(D′)−H(D)] dv dη0
=
∫ ∞
−∞
∫ ∞
−∞
Pr
νt′,i′
[νt′,i′ = vˆ] Pr
η
[η = ηˆ0]1[η0 ∈
(H(D′), ξt′ · (ft′,i′(D′t′) + v − T )] dv dη0
≤
∫ ∞
−∞
∫ ∞
−∞
exp
(
ξt′
4
(
ξt0∆t0
ξt′
+∆t′
))
Pr
νt′,i′
[νt′,i′ = v] exp
(
ξt0∆t0
2
)
Pr
η
[η = η0]
· 1[η0 ∈ (H(D′), ξt′ · (ft′,i′(D′t′) + v − T )] dv dη0
= exp
(
ξt′
4
(
ξt0∆t0
ξt′
+∆t′
)
+
ξt0∆t0
2
)
· Pr
η,νt′,i′
[H(D′) < η and ξt′ · (ft′,i′(D′t′) + νt′,i′ − T ) ≥ η]
= exp
(
ξt0∆t0
4
+
ξt′∆t′
4
+
ξt0∆t0
2
)
Pr
η,νt′,i′
[A′ = a]
≤ exp (ξt0∆t0) Pr
η,νt′ ,i′
[A′ = a]
The first inequality comes from the bounds on |vˆ− v|, |ηˆ0 − η0| and the pdf of Laplace distribution. The
last inequality is by ξt∆t being non-increasing.
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Next, we define accuracy for threshold algorithms and then give an accuracy guarantee for ATG.
Definition 6 (Accuracy of Threshold Answers). For α, β > 0, an algorithm that produces threshold answers
is (α, β)-accurate for (finite) query stream F = {{ft,i}ℓti=1}t0≤t≤t′ and threshold T if for any input database
stream D = {Dt}t≥t0 , with probability at least 1− β the algorithm outputs answers at,i ∈ {⊥,⊤} such that
it does not halt before receiving the final query ft′,ℓt′ and for all at,i = ⊤,
ft,i(Dt) ≥ T − α
and for all at,i = ⊥,
ft,i(Dt) ≤ T + α
Theorem 26 (Accurary of ATG). Let ξ,∆ : {t0, t0 + 1, . . .} → R+ be such that both ∆, ξ · ∆ are non-
increasing and ξ is non-decreasing. For α > 0, ATG(D,F, T, ξ) is (α, β)-accurate for threshold T and finite
query stream F = {{ft,i}ℓti=1}t0≤t≤t′ with sensitivity ∆ft,i ≤ ∆t for all (t, i) and ft,i(Dt) < T − α for all
(t, i) 6= (t′, ℓt′) and ft′,ℓt′ (Dt′) ≥ T + α as long as
β ≥
t′∑
t=t0
ℓt exp(−αξt
8
) + exp(−αξt0
8
)
Proof. First, we want to show that at,i = ⊥ if and only if (t, i) < (t′, i′) with high probability. This is true
if we can show that for all (t, i),
|νt,i − η
ξt
| ≤ α (C.1)
Because if so, we have that for all (t, i) < (t′, i′), ft,i(Dt)+νt,i < (T −α)+(α+ ηξt ) = Tˆt, so ATG will output
⊥, and that ft′,i′(Dt′) + νt′,i′ ≥ (T + α) + ( ηξt − α) = Tˆt, so ATG will output at′,i′ = ⊤. To show (C.1), it is
sufficient to require |νt,i| ≤ α/2 and | ηξt | ≤ α/2 for all (t, i). The first requirement is false with probability
exp(−α2 ξt4 ) = exp(−αξt8 ) for each (t, i). The second requirement is equivalent to | ηξt0 | ≤ α/2 for a single time
step t0, which is false with probability exp(−αξt04 ). By union bound, (C.1) is true except probability at most
exp(−αξt04 ) +
∑t′
t=t0
ℓt exp(−αξt8 ) ≤ exp(−
αξt0
8 ) +
∑t′
t=t0
ℓt exp(−αξt8 ).
C.2 Numeric Above Threshold for Growing Databases
Next we analyze privacy and accuracy for NATG, which extends ATG by outputting a noisy answer to the
first above threshold query.
Algorithm 5 NATG(D,F, T, ξ)
for each incoming query ft,i do
if i = 1 then
Let Tˆt ← T + Lap( 2ξt ) ⊲ Noisy threshold for queries at time t
end if
Let νt,i ← Lap( 4ξt ) ⊲ Noise for query ft,i
if ft,i(Dt) + νt,i ≥ Tˆt then
Output at,i ← ft,i(Dt) + Lap( 8ξt ) and halt ⊲ Abort on first query above threshold
else
Output at,i ← ⊥
end if
end for
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Theorem 27 (Privacy of NATG). Let ξ,∆ : {t0, t0 + 1, . . .} → R+ be such that both ∆, ξ · ∆ are non-
increasing and ξ is non-decreasing. Let F = {{ft,i}ℓti=1}t≥t0 be a stream of queries with sensitivity ∆ft,i ≤ ∆t
for all (t, i). Then for any a in the range of ATG halting at time t′ and any neighboring database streams
D,D′ of starting size t0,
Pr [NATG(D,F, T, ξ) = a] ≤ exp
(
ξt0∆t0 +
ξt′∆t′
8
)
Pr [NATG(D′, F, T, ξ) = a]
Proof. NATG privacy loss is the sum of ATG privacy loss and the loss by Laplace noise Lap( 8ξt′
) added
to the numeric answer at′,i′ . The first is ∆t0ξt0 by Theorem 25 and the latter is ξt′∆t′/8 because ft′,i has
sensitivity at most 1/∆t′ .
Next, we define accuracy for numeric threshold algorithms and give an accuracy guarantee for NATG.
Definition 7 (Accuracy of Threshold and Numeric Answers). For α, β > 0, an algorithm that produces
threshold and numeric answers is (α, β)-accurate for (finite) query stream F = {{ft,i}ℓti=1}t0≤t≤t′ and thresh-
old T if for any input database stream D = {Dt}t≥t0 , with probability 1− β the algorithm outputs answers
at,i ∈ R ∪ ⊥ such that it does not halt before receiving the final query ft′,ℓt′ and for all at,i ∈ R,
|ft,i(Dt)− at,i| ≤ α and ft,i(Dt) ≥ T − α
and for all at,i = ⊥,
ft,i(Dt) ≤ T + α
Theorem 28 (Accurary of NATG). Let ξ,∆ : {t0, t0 + 1, . . .} → R+ be such that both ∆, ξ · ∆ are non-
increasing and ξ is non-decreasing. For α > 0, NATG(D,F, T, ξ) is (α, β)-accurate for threshold T and finite
query stream F = {{ft,i}ℓti=1}t0≤t≤t′ with sensitivity ∆ft,i ≤ ∆t for all (t, i) and ft,i(Dt) < T − α for all
(t, i) 6= (t′, ℓt′) and ft′,ℓt′ (Dt′) ≥ T + α as long as
β ≥
t′∑
t=t0
ℓt exp(−αξt
8
) + exp(−αξt0
8
) + exp(−αξt′
8
)
Proof. We apply Theorem 26 so that except with at most probability
∑t′
t=t0
ℓt exp(−αξt8 ) + exp(−
αξt0
8 ),
NATG is accurate for threshold answers, i.e. ft,i(Dt) ≥ T − α and ft,i(Dt) ≤ T + α hold for at,i ∈ R and
at,i = ⊥, respectively.
It’s left to show that |ft′,i′(Dt′)− at′,i′ | ≤ α. This is true except with probability exp(−αξt′8 ) by Laplace
mechanism. Therefore,
β ≤
t′∑
t=t0
ℓt exp(−αξt
8
) + exp(−αξt0
8
) + exp(−αξt′
8
)
C.3 Numeric Sparse for Growing Databases
We now compose NATG multiple times into numeric sparse for growing databases (NSG). Note that we may
run NATG infinitely many times as long as there is input coming online. Any query that causes NATG to
output a number and halt is called hard; any other query is called easy.
Analysis of privacy of NSG can be done by simply summing up the privacy loss stated for NATG. Since
privacy for NATG changes over time, this privacy loss is then dependent on the time that NATG starts and
ends, i.e. when hard queries come.
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Algorithm 6 NSG(D,F, T, ξ)
for each incoming query ft,i do
if no NATG subroutine is currently running then
Initialize a NATG subroutine with the same arguments
end if
Output the NATG subroutine’s output for ft,i.
end for
Theorem 29 (Privacy of NSG). Let ξ,∆ : {t0, t0+1, . . .} → R+ be such that both ∆, ξ ·∆ are non-increasing
and ξ is non-decreasing. Let F = {{ft,i}ℓti=1}t≥t0 be a stream of queries with sensitivity ∆ft,i ≤ ∆t for all
(t, i). Then for any a in the range of NSG with ht hard queries arriving at time t for each t ≥ t0 and any
neighboring database streams D,D′ of starting size t0,
Pr [NSG(D,F, T, ξ) = a] ≤ exp

ξt0∆t0 + 98
∑
t≥t+0
htξt∆t

Pr [NSG(D′, F, T, ξ) = a]
Proof. Let tj0, t
j
1 be the start and end time of jth round of NATG in NSG. Then by Theorem 27, the privacy
loss is at most
ǫ :=
∑
j
(
ξtj0
∆tj0
+
ξtj1
∆tj1
8
)
The start time tj0 of round j is at least the end time of last round t
j−1
1 for each j ≥ 2, and t10 ≥ n, so
ǫ ≤ ξn∆n +
∑
j
(
ξtj1
∆tj1
+
ξtj1
∆tj1
8
)
= ξn∆n +
9
8
∞∑
t=n
htξt∆t
The last equality is by the fact that the end times of NATG are exactly when hard queries come.
Now we apply Theorem 29 to a more specific setting of linear queries.
Corollary 30. For adaptively chosen linear query stream F , NSG(D,F, T, ξ) for database streams of starting
size n and noise function ξt = t
p for some p ∈ [0, 1] is (np−1 + 98
∑∞
t=n htt
p−1, 0)-DP.
Proof. From the fact that ξt is non-decreasing, that linear queries have sensitivity ∆t = 1/t, and that
ξt∆t = t
p−1 is non-increasing, the conditions satisfy Theorem 25’s assumption, so we can apply Theorem
29.
Corollary 30 suggests that in order to bound privacy loss, we need to bound the number of hard queries,
especially those arriving early in time.
Now we state the accuracy for NSG. Note that we use the same Definition 7 from NATG, since NSG also
produces threshold and numeric answers.
Theorem 31 (Accuracy of NSG). Let ξ,∆ : {t0, t0 + 1, . . .} → R+ be such that both ∆, ξ · ∆ are
non-increasing and ξ is non-decreasing. Let k : {t0, t0 + 1, . . .} → R be a query budget. For α > 0,
NATG(D,F, T, ξ) is (α, β)-accurate for threshold T and finite query stream F = {{ft,i}ℓti=1}t0≤t≤t′ with
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sensitivity ∆ft,i ≤ ∆t for all (t, i) and respecting cumulative query budget for
∑t
τ=t0
ℓt ≤
∑t
τ=t0
kt for all
t ≥ t0 as long as
β ≥ exp(−αξn
8
) +
∞∑
t=n
(ℓt + 2ht) exp(−αξt
8
), (C.2)
where ht = |{i : ft,i(Dt) ≥ T − α}| for t ≥ t0. This implies (α, β)-accuracy for
β ≥ exp(−αξn
8
) + 3
∞∑
t=n
kt exp(−αξt
8
). (C.3)
Proof. We need to show that except with probability at most β:
1. For each at,i = ⊥, ft,i(Dt) ≤ T + α
2. For each at,i ∈ R, ft,i(Dt) ≥ T − α
3. For each at,i ∈ R, |ft,i(Dt)− at,i| ≤ α
Suppose the jth round of NATG starts and ends at time tj0, t
j
1, and answers ℓ
j
t queries at time t. The set
of three conditions is equivalent to requiring that jth NATG round satisfies Definition 7 with respect to
threshold T and stream of queries that jth round of NATG answers. By Theorem 28 and union bound, the
rest of the proof is a calculation: we can take β to be
β =
∑
j
( ∞∑
t=n
ℓjt exp(−
αξt
8
) + exp(−
αξtj0
8
) + exp(−
αξtj1
8
)
)
≤
∑
j
( ∞∑
t=n
kjt exp(−
αξt
8
)
)
+
∑
j
(
exp(−
αξtj−11
8
) + exp(−
αξtj−11
8
)
)
≤
( ∞∑
t=n
ℓt exp(−αξt
8
)
)
+ exp(−αξn
8
) +
∑
j
2 exp(−
αξtj1
8
)
The first inequality is by the fact that start time of the next round is after the end of the current round, and
we let t01 = n for convenience. By condition (2), NATG can only halt on queries ft,i such that ft,i(Dt) ≥ T−α,
so there are at most ht rounds of NATG halting at time t. Therefore,
2
∑
j
exp(−
αξtj1
8
) ≤ 2
∞∑
t=n
ht exp(−αξt
8
)
which finishes the proof for (C.2). Inequality (C.3) follows from the observations that ℓt ≥ ht and that
exp(−αξt8 ) is a non-increasing function of t.
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